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INTRODUCTION
The attempt to reduce all persons to the unity of a common measure
constructs as deviant those whose attributes differ from the group-
specific attributes implicitly presumed in the norm. The drive to
unify the particularity and multiplicity of practices, cultural
symbols, and ways of relating in clear and distinct categories turns
difference into exclusion.'
Like many other areas of human thought, there is an impulse in law to use
categories to understand and simplify complex concepts, such as social identity.
In law, identity is understood in a two dimensional manner: difference is
recognized but the context of these differences-relationships-is not always
acknowledged. Instead, identity is understood through the legal categorization
of differences. Through the process of categorization, legal narratives
effectively strip the subject of agency by denying the subject the possibility of
self-definition-for example, the agency to assert whether one is female, male,
or neither.2 In this way, legal categories become constitutive of one's identity
(e.g. not male equals female, not white equals black, not middle- (or upper-)
class equals poor). One of the effects of establishing and maintaining
categories of difference and identity is to make these differences (of one's
identity) concrete rather than fluid. Thus differences become abstracted from
their context of shifting social relationships. Another effect is to make these
identities appear natural and immutable. Categories also create boundaries and
borders between identities. These borders are inhabited by identities that fail or
refuse categorization due, in large part, to their fluidity.
In order to explore the practical and theoretical implications of the use of
categories in law, I propose to focus on an identity that disrupts the legal
process of categorization. It inhabits the borders of these legal identity
categories and problematizes the concept of identity itself. It is
transgenderism.
3
In concrete terms, legal categories affect the lives of transgender people in
countless ways. Due to their perceived gender non-conformity, or their failure
or measured refusal to fit into extant legal categories, transgender people face
1. IRIS MARION YOUNG, JUSTICE AND THE POLITICS OF DIFFERENCE 169 (1990).
2. Nitya lyer, Categorical Denials: Equality Rights and the Shaping of Social Identity, 19 QUEENS
L.J. 179, 185 (1994). For an applied critique of the usefulness of legal categories, see Audrey Macklin,
Refugee Women and the Imperative of Categories 17 HUM. RTS. Q. 213 (1995).
3. By the term "transgenderism" I mean all those persons whose gender identity does not conform
to the rigid gender binary of male/female. It includes those who cross-dress, those who perform drag,
those whose gender presentation is ambiguous, those who live and identify as a sex that differs from the
sex they were assigned at birth, those who do not identify as any sex, and those who undergo surgery in
order to have their anatomy match their self-identified sex. Those in this very last identification are




almost daily harassment, violence, and discrimination. Recently, however,
transgender people have begun embracing anti-discrimination laws as a
potential avenue of protection from these forms of injury.
This paper examines the implications of this move to embrace and
negotiate anti-discrimination laws. In particular, it focuses on the operation
and effect of anti-discrimination law and its use of identity categories. In
addition, this paper examines how transgender people use legal categories in
their search for equality and emancipation. I aim to demonstrate in this paper
that the emancipatory attempt by transgender people to encode legal categories
with their identity and difference is not a path entirely free of danger.
For example, current U.S. anti-discrimination law appears to operate by
attempting to eliminate gender norms and stereotypes of the "real woman" and
the "real man." But it is clear that in order to eliminate such gender norms and
stereotypes, the law must at first construct and reiterate them. This raises the
following questions: Do legal categories effectively operate to enforce the
gender norms and stereotypes of appearance and behavior? Is there a
possibility that these norms and stereotypes can be eliminated, disrupted or
transformed in, or by, the law? Should law regulate discrimination by aiming
to eliminate differences, such as gender non-conformity, so as to treat everyone
"the same"? Or should law aim to accommodate and affirm such differences?
What effect does legal recognition of such differences have on identity?
These questions arise in an examination of transgenderism's engagement
with sex discrimination law. In the first part of this paper I undertake a
comparative analysis of the operation and effect of anti-discrimination laws in
relation to transgender claimants in courts in the United States, Europe, and
Canada.4 I begin by examining U.S. equality jurisprudence where two
competing approaches to the application of Title VII to transgender people are
apparent. The traditional Title VII jurisprudence refuses to protect transgender
persons from discrimination in the workplace. Here the courts take a narrow
interpretive approach, focusing on Congress' intent to protect only those who
are discriminated against because of their maleness or femaleness. The new
jurisprudence focuses more broadly on sex stereotyping rather than strictly on
Congressional intent. It represents a shift towards a potentially more
emancipatory approach in that it promises protection for those persons,
transgender or otherwise, who project astereotypical and non-conforming
gender norms. This approach is increasingly becoming the trend in this area of
anti-discrimination law litigation in the United States.
I then analyze the approaches of the courts in Europe and Canada. These
courts have been ready to read the category of "sex" in discrimination law
broadly enough to cover transitional transsexuals. The general approach of the
4. For the purposes of this paper, Australia is not a good comparator as it has minimal case law in
this area. See note 129.
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European Court of Justice is, however, similar to the traditional United States'
approach in that it is very legalistic, focusing narrowly on the words and
intentions of the relevant provisions. From its use of the "similarly situated"
comparator test, it is apparent that the European Court of Justice generally
searches for an ideal of formal equality. I argue that within this body of
equality jurisprudence, the decision of P. v. S. and Cornwall County Council,
5
which recognizes discrimination against transitional transsexuals as sex
discrimination, constitutes an anomaly.
In Canada, the courts have been more ready to expand the category of sex
discrimination to cover transgenderism. While taking a purposive approach,
Canadian courts and tribunals generally consider the question of discrimination
in relation to disadvantage, either pre-existing disadvantage or disadvantage as
produced by certain acts. Canadian jurisprudence searches for a substantive
notion of equality that aims to accommodate and possibly affirm difference. I
argue that this approach is broader than that of the new approach in the United
States and that, therefore, it may be more practically useful in the long term.
Following this outline of the approaches, I turn in the second part of the
paper to the question of which is the best jurisprudential approach to
discrimination against transgender claimants. This question involves a
consideration not only of the practical results of each approach but also of their
theoretical underpinnings. The U.S. approach, for example, aims to eliminate
difference. Through the work of Robert Post, I examine the implications and
potential of this approach. I query whether difference, as embodied and
experienced by transgender people, should be symbolically eliminated or
whether we should seek. to symbolically (and practically) accommodate and
affirm such difference. The ideal of eliminating difference imports the problem
of encouraging assimilation. I therefore argue that the Canadian approach,
which positively recognizes difference, should be ideally embraced.
In concluding I assert that when considering how transgender people can
use law and its categories, it is imperative not to lose sight of the dangers
involved in installing identity and difference in the law. To examine this
concern, I consider the implications of Catherine MacKinnon's attempt to
encode "women's collective experience" into the law. This example
demonstrates that caution is necessary before fully embracing the ostensibly
emancipatory approach of installing transgender identity into anti-
discrimination law.
5. Case C-13/94, 1996 E.C.R 1-2143.
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Sex or Gender Discrimination?
The following case law in the United States, Europe, and Canada addresses
the question of whether transgender people are covered under the term "sex
discrimination" and/or the term "gender discrimination." It raises the related
question of whether sex discrimination and gender discrimination are distinct
concepts or whether the two terms are interchangeable. In the United States
Supreme Court case of J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. TB.,6 Justice Scalia expressed
his preference for the term "sex" discrimination and that be it kept separate
from the concept of "gender" discrimination. In his view, "the word 'gender'
has acquired the new and useful connotation of cultural or attitudinal
characteristics (as opposed to physical characteristics) distinctive to the sexes.
That is to say, gender is to sex as feminine is to female and masculine is to
male.",7 In this preference, it is evident that Justice Scalia believes that
discrimination emanates from the fact of a person's biological maleness or
femaleness rather than from the cultural or attitudinal characteristics of
feminine and masculine associated with that femaleness or maleness. In
contrast, Katherine Franke generally prefers to use the term "gender
discrimination" because it covers a broader field of discrimination. 8 In her
view, the central mistake of sex discrimination law is the disaggregation of sex
from gender. Her main argument is that sex discrimination focuses too
narrowly on biology and fails to take account of the social practice of gender as
a set of behavioral, performative norms of which sex is a part. "Sex
discrimination" ignores the question of whether a person, who is the subject of
discrimination because their appearance or behavior, conforms to expected
levels of masculinity and femininity. She argues: "The wrong of sex
discrimination must be understood to include all gender role stereotypes
whether imposed upon men, women, or both men and women in a particular
workplace.
9
One of the problems facing transgender discrimination claimants is that
courts insist on labeling their condition as one of gender identity and yet they
generally determine the sex of transgender claimants according to their
biological sex (i.e., the courts' determination of sex fails to take into account
the factor of gender identity). In U.S. traditional jurisprudence, this
classification has presented problems for transgender claimants in that their
claims have been characterized as constituting "gender discrimination" that is
not covered under narrow formulations of "sex discrimination," such as those
espoused by Justice Scalia. Only recently have the two terms "sex" and
6. J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 511 U.S. 127 (1994).
7. Id. at 157n.1.
8. See Katherine Franke, The Central Mistake of Sex Discrimination Law: The Disagreggation of
Sex from Gender, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1 (1995).
9. Id. at 8.
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"gender" become understood as inclusive or interchangeable in discrimination
law. However, as I show in the following section, Justice Scalia's view is
consistent with the traditional equality jurisprudence regarding transsexuality in
the United States.
Ultimately, the debate about whether transsexuals are subjects of "sex
discrimination" or "gender discrimination" is of little value: it is pure semantics
given that (as we shall see) few legislatures have considered such questions at
the time of drafting anti-discrimination laws. I aim to demonstrate in this paper
that this strict interpretive approach involves a process whereby courts set out
the applicable categories and then define the complainant so as to slot into
these extant categories, thereby reducing the complainant's complex identity to
a single (or couple of) attribute(s). Both this process and the semantic debate
about sex and gender have distracted courts from the real question of what
constitutes discrimination and inequality. In the following comparative
analysis, I show that few jurisdictions have seriously addressed this question. I
argue that, so far, only Canadian jurisprudence consistently moves beyond this
semantic debate into more substantive questions of discrimination.
I. A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF DISCRIMINATION LAWS AND
TRANSGENDER LITIGATION
A. Jurisprudence in the United States
1. Traditional Jurisprudence
Transsexual claims in regard to employment discrimination have been
argued generally along three avenues in the United States: first, and most
commonly, under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act 1964 and other similar
human rights legislation; second, under the Fourteenth Amendment to the
United States Constitution-predominantly the Equal Protection Clause; and
third, under various disability Acts. For the purpose of this chapter, I will focus
on only the first two avenues.
Both of these avenues were pursued in Holloway v. Arthur Andersen °
where a male-to-female ("MTF") transsexual, Ramona Holloway, claimed that
Arthur Andersen had discriminated against her in employment on account of
her sex. One year after joining the accounting firm as Robert Holloway, she
began female hormone treatment and four years later informed her supervisor
of her intention to undergo sex reassignment surgery. A company official
10. Holloway v. Arthur Andersen, 566 F.2d 659 (1977).
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responded to this by suggesting that she would be happier at a new job where
her transsexualism was unknown. Shortly after she had her records changed to
reflect her new name, her employment was terminated.
In this case, the Ninth Circuit articulated the "sole issue" as being "whether
an employee may be discharged, consistent with Title VII, for initiating the
process of sex transformation."'1 In determining this issue, the court noted the
affidavit of Holloway's supervisor, which stated that Holloway's employment
was not terminated because of transsexualism "but because the dress,
appearance, and manner [Holloway] was affecting were such that it was very
disruptive and embarrassing to all concerned."'12 It referred to her "red lipstick
and nail polish, hairstyle, jewelry and clothing," her use of the men's room and
"his behavior at social functions" as constituting a problem for the employer. 13
In her submissions, Holloway contended that "sex," as used in Title VII,
can be used synonymously with "gender," and that "gender" encompasses
transsexuals. To determine this question regarding the scope of Title VII, the
court focused on the legislative history of the "sex" discrimination provision in
Title VII. It noted that the provision was included at the last minute, apparently
in a bid to scuttle the entire Civil Rights Bill. The court found that relevant
amendments made in 1972 intended to place women on an equal footing with
men. From this brief analysis the court stated that Congress had "only the
traditional notions of 'sex' in mind."'14 Ignoring the fact that Title VII is a
remedial statute that should be liberally construed, it argued that "this narrow
definition [is] even more evident" given the later introduction and failure of
amendments intended to expand "sex" to cover "sexual preference."' 5 Without
explaining the relevance of these failed "sexual preference" amendments to the
question of transsexualism, the court concluded that it was unable to expand the
meaning of sex to cover transsexualism "in the absence of Congressional
mandate."16
Thus, without examining the interrelated meaning of the concepts of sex
and gender, the court rejected Holloway's submission that sex and gender were
synonymous terms and instead accepted the defendant's submission that sex be
given its "traditional definition based on anatomical characteristics" because
this definition was what Congress intended. 17 In concluding that Title VII does
not embrace discrimination against transsexuals, the court stated that the
11. Id. at 661.
12. Id. at 661, n.l.
13. Id.
14. Id. at 662. The court failed to elaborate on this point, but from the decision it is clear that the
court meant biological sex.
15. Id. at 662. Regarding the construction of remedial statutes, see NORMAN J. SINGER,
SOUTHERLAND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION, § 60.01 (5th ed, 1992); see, eg., Westinghouse Elec. Corp.
v. Pacific Gas & Electric Co., 326 F.2d 575, 580 (9th Cir. 1964); Ulane v. Eastern Airlines Inc., 742
F.2d 1081, 1086 (7th Cir. 1984).
16. Holloway, 566 F.2d at 663.
17. Id at 662.
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"manifest purpose of Title VII's prohibition against sex discrimination in
employment is to ensure that men and women are treated equally."'
' 8
In Holloway we see the court implying that for the purposes of equality
law, a transitional transsexual such as Ramona Holloway can be defined as
neither a man nor a woman but as a transsexual for whom there is no Title VII
protection. A transitional transsexual thus has no sex status for the purposes of
Title VII while she or he is attempting to make her or his body conform to her
or his psychological sex. Furthermore, gender and sex are cast as unrelated
terms: biology and anatomy are drawn as somehow completely disparate from
socially constructed identity.
In dissent, Judge Goodwin argued that there was bias in the majority
opinion in that the right to claim discrimination under Title VII is limited by the
decision to those who were "born into the victim class."'19 In other words, the
decision's logic was that Holloway was unable to argue sex discrimination as a
woman merely because she was not born a woman. Judge Goodwin asserted
that, had Holloway's employer waited to terminate her employment post-
surgery, the act would have to be classified as one based upon sex. In his view,
it served no valid Title VII purpose to distinguish between a termination while
Holloway was in a condition that had "not yet become stationary," and a
termination made a few days before or after surgery: "[t]he result is the
same.... The relevant fact is that she was, on the day she was fired, a
purported female.",
20
The second avenue, the Equal Protection Clause, was argued on the basis
that the exclusion of transsexuals from the coverage of Title VII operates to
exclude transsexuals as a class. The court rejected this argument that
transsexuals are a "suspect class," on the grounds that they are not a "discrete
and insular minority" and further, that transsexuality has not been established
as an "immutable characteristic determined solely by the accident of birth."'
'
In addition it rejected the argument that Title VII excludes transsexuals. In the
court's view, a transsexual can claim discrimination because he or she is male
or female, but not because he or she is a transsexual who chose to change his or
22her sex. Thus the court attempted to set up a meaningful distinction between
discrimination because of sex and discrimination because of a change of sex.
18. Id. at 663.
19. Id. at 664.
20. Id.
21. Holloway, 566 F.2d at 663.
22. Id. at 664. See also Kristine Holt, Re-Evaluating Holloway: Title VII Equal Protection, and
the Evolution ofa Transgender Jurisprudence, 70 TEMP. L. REv. 283, 292 (1997). (In Holt's view, the
court's refusal to afford equal protection to transsexuals, or sexual minorities in general, is a proposition
unsupported by other case law. As an example she cites the public crossdressing cases of Doe v.
McCann, 489 F. Supp. 76 (S.D. Tex. 1980), and City of Chicago v. Wilson, 389 N.E.2d 522 (II1. 1987),
as well as the Supreme Court decision in Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996).
[Vol. 15: 51
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These two avenues have been unsuccessfully pursued in other cases such
as Voyles v. Ralph K Davies Medical Center,23 Kirkpatrick v. Seligman v. Latz
24 25 26Inc., Sommers v. Budget Marketing Inc., Ulane v. Eastern Airlines Inc.,
and Dobre v. National R.R. Passenger Corp.
27
In Dobre the Pennsylvania District Court addressed the question of
whether the term "sex" as used in Title VII is synonymous with the term
"gender." The facts here were that Andria Dobre was a MTF transitional
transsexual who was required by her employer to use the male washroom and
to dress in traditionally male attire unless she had a doctor's note. Her
employer referred to her by her former male name, and removed her desk from
public view. Dobre asserted that she was discriminated against because of her
new gender "while she was transforming her body to conform" to it. Focusing
once again on Congress' intent, the court differentiated between sex and
gender, determining that sex referred to "an individual's distinguishing
biological or anatomical characteristics" and that gender referred to an
individual's "sexual identity., 28 The court stated: "Accordingly, an employer
may not discriminate against a female because she is female.',29  The court
failed to clarify whether an employer may discriminate against a female
because she is, or is not, feminine. Thus the court implied that transsexuals
suffer from "sexual identity" problems, as opposed to problems associated with
23. Voyles v. Ralph K Davies Medical Center, 403 F. Supp. 456 (Cal. 1975). In this case, a district
Court dismissed the plaintiff's claim of sex discrimination after she was dismissed upon informing her
employer that she intended to undergo sex reassignment surgery. The court took a strict purposive
approach in stating that Congress did not intend to cover such employment discrimination.
24. Kirkpatrick v. Seligman v. Latz Inc., 636 F.2d 1047 (5th Cir. 1981). In this case, the MTF
transsexual plaintiff argued that her employer's conduct in requiring her to wear male clothing amounted
to conspiracy designed and intended to deny and deprive transsexuals as a class. The Fifth Circuit held
that this question was not necessary to decide because in its view the complaint did not allege conduct
that discriminated against such a class or "against the plaintiff qua transsexual." Id. at 1050.
25. Sommers v. Budget Marketing Inc., 667 F.2d 748 (8th Cir. 1982). Here Audra Sommers, a
MTF transsexual, unsuccessfully argued that she had suffered sex discrimination when her employment
was terminated upon informing her superior of her intention to undergo a sex change. Budget alleged
that Sommers had misrepresented herself as an anatomical female when she applied for the job and that
the misrepresentation led to a disruption of the company's work routine in that a number of female
employees indicated they would leave if Sommers were permitted to use the women's bathroom. The
Eighth Circuit took a strict purposive approach in construing Title VII and also considered that
Sommers's interests were outweighed by the interests of other employees due to practical problems such
as bathrooms and the need to protect the privacy interests of other employees.
26. Ulane v. Eastern Airlines Inc., 742 F.2d 1081 (7th Cir. 1984). The Seventh Circuit held that
Ulane, a MTF transsexual pilot who was dismissed after her operation, did not come under the
protection of "sex" because she was a transsexual. The court held that "sex" under Title VII should be
interpreted narrowly as to mean "no more than biological male or biological female." Id. at 1087. The
court found that Ulane was not being discriminated against on the grounds of biology but identity: the
court's logic was that she was not discriminated against as a female because the company did not
perceive her as a female. There is also state court jurisprudence that takes the same restrictive approach.
See, e.g., Sommers v. Iowa Civil Rights Commission, 337 N.W.2d 470 (Iowa 1983). But see Maffei v.
Koaleton Industry Inc., 626 N.Y.S.2d 391 (1995) for an alternative approach.
27. Dobre v. National RR Passenger Corp., 850 F. Supp. 284 (E.D. Pa. 1993).
28. Id. at 286.
29. Id.
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their biological or anatomical characteristics, and that these are problems
related to gender, which are not covered by the term sex. This sparse decision
effectively held that Title VII does not cover gender discrimination and that
gender discrimination is the only term that applies to discrimination against
transsexuals. The court added that "the acts of discrimination alleged by the
plaintiff were not due to stereotypic concepts about a woman's ability to
perform a job nor were they due to a condition common to women alone. If the
plaintiff was discriminated against at all, it was because she was perceived as a
male who wanted to become a female.,
30
In this line of jurisprudence we see the courts taking a very narrow view of
the term "sex," which, as we saw in Holloway, has the effect of casting
transsexuals as neither male nor female but as a third sex-the sex that changes
sex. Thus, because transgender claimants cannot be easily slotted within the
legal category of "sex," they do not qualify for protection under Title VII,
despite the fact that Congress has given no consideration to the question. As a
consequence, transitional transsexuals are not recognized as legally protected
persons. The social effect is to encourage transsexuals to conform as much,
and as quickly, as possible to male and female sex stereotypes. 31 Transsexuals
are thus placed in a double bind: they are discriminated against for their gender
non-conformity, and criticized (by radical feminists such as Janice Raymond)
32
precisely for their conformity and assimilation. This line of legal reasoning
also encourages transsexuals to withdraw from the public sphere while
undergoing transition and to erase their transsexual identity and history once
they have performed the transition. They are encouraged to eliminate their
difference in order to be accepted as social and legal subjects.
From the facts of these cases it is also apparent that a transsexual
employee's biology is just one factor in an employer's decision to terminate
employment. The major factor appears to be the lack of continuity or
"harmony" between the employee's "cultural and attitudinal characteristics"
and their biology.33 This lack of continuity defies conventional expectations.
2. New Jurisprudence
Some courts have been critical of this rigid interpretation of sex and gender
in transgender case law. In Maffei v. Kolaeton Industry, Inc. the Supreme
Court of New York County found that the rulings in the above federal cases
30. Id. at 287.
31. This arguably parallels the gender conformity encouraged and required by gender identity
clinics in the one to two year period that transsexuals undergo pre-surgery "life tests." See, e.g., PAT
CALIFIA, SEX CHANGES: THE POLITICS OF TRANSGENDERISM ch. 2 (1997).
32. JANICE G. RAYMOND, THE TRANSSEXUAL EMPIRE: THE MAKING OF THE SHE-MALE (rev. ed.,
1994).
33. J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 511 U.S. 127 (1994) at 157, ni.
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were "unduly restrictive," and it decided that such precedent should not be
followed in interpreting a New York City statute.3 4 In Maffei, the New York
City statute was similar to Title VII except that the term "gender" was
substituted for the term "sex." Maffei was subsequently followed by Rentos v.
35OCE-Office Systems, where a. post-operative FTM transsexual alleged sex
discrimination and harassment under New York state and municipal human
rights laws after his employer refused his request to make payments for
expenses connected with his sex change. Citing Maffei as precedent, the
District Court in Rentos held that transsexuals are protected under both state
and municipal human rights laws despite the fact that the state statute uses the
term "sex" rather than "gender."3 6  Unfortunately, the judgment provided
negligible analysis of the interchangeability of the two terms and failed to
examine the breadth of the term "sex." Thus, though the precedent value of the
decision is minimal, it nevertheless stands as an indicator of the unwillingness
of at least some lower courts to take a rigid approach in this field.
Some commentators believe that the tide may be turning in relation to
federal protection against discrimination for transsexuals. 3 7  First, there is a
glimmer of hope in relation to the Equal Protection Clause as a result of dicta in
Brown v. Zavaras, which suggested that Holloway may need re-evaluation
given recent scientific research.38  Recent cases provide greater hope of the
possibility of the inclusion of transsexuals under Title VII. In particular, the
case of Schwenk v. Harford39 provides this hope in its relaxation of the
distinction between the terms "sex" and "gender." In Schwenk, a pre-operative
MTF transsexual inmate of a male prison made a claim under the Gender
Motivated Violence Act ° (GMVA) in respect to an attempted rape by a prison
guard that she alleged was motivated by her gender. The Ninth Circuit held
that the term "gender" as used in the GMVA should not be narrowly construed,
but should be interpreted to encompass those who do not conform to socially
41prescribed gender expectations.
34. Maffei v. Kolaeton Indus., Inc., 626 N.Y.S.2d 391, 394 (1995).
35. Rentos v. OCE Office Sys., 72 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1717 (S.D.N.Y. 1996).
36. Id.
37. See Taylor Flynn, Transforming the Debate: Why We Need to Include Transgender Rights in
the Struggles for Sex and Sexual Orientation Equality, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 392 (2001).
38. Brown v. Zavaras, 63 F.3d 967, 971 (10th Cir. 1995). In this case a pre-operative MTF
transsexual inmate in a male prison made an Equal Protection Clause claim because she was refused the
provision of female hormones despite the fact that other inmates were provided with hormones-post-
operative transsexuals and inmates with low hormone levels. The Tenth Circuit suggested re-evaluation
of Holloway but nevertheless referred to it as authority in dismissing Brown's claim. It stated, "Mr.
Brown's allegations are too conclusory to allow proper analysis of this legal question."
39. Schwenk v. Hartford, 204 F.3d 1187 (9th Cir. 2000).
40. Gender Motivated Violence Act, 42 U.S.C.S. § 13981 (2003).
41. The court also held that the defendant was entitled to qualified immunity from the plaintiffs
GMVA claim since the law regarding this question was not clearly established at the time of his alleged
sexual assault.
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The court in Schwenk found that the GMVA paralleled Title VII except
that it used the term "gender" rather than "sex." Addressing the defendant's
submission that he was motivated not by Schwenk's gender but by her
transsexuality, the court proceeded to consider the use and definitions of the
terms "sex" and "gender" in Holloway, Dobre, and Ulane. It found that in
these cases "[m]ale-to-female transsexuals, as anatomical males whose outward
behavior and inward identity did not meet social definitions of masculinity,
were denied the protection of Title VII by these courts because they were the
victims of gender, rather than sex, discrimination., 42 In making a critical
departure from this line of traditional Title VII jurisprudence, the court stated:
The initial judicial approach taken in cases such as Holloway has been
overruled by the logic and language of Price Waterhouse. In Price
Waterhouse, which was decided after Holloway and Ulane, the
Supreme Court held that Title VII barred not just discrimination based
on the fact that she failed "to act like a woman"-that is, to conform to
socially-constructed gender expectations.... What matters for the
purposes of this part of the Price Waterhouse analysis, is that in the
mind of the perpetrator the discrimination is related to the sex of the
victim: here, for example, the perpetrator's actions stem from the fact
that he believed that the victim was a man who "failed to act like" one.
Thus, under Price Waterhouse, "sex" under Title VII encompasses
both sex-that is, biological differences between men and women-
and gender. Discrimination because one fails to act in the way
expected of a man or woman is forbidden under Title VII.
43
The Court concluded that both the GMVA and Title VII prohibit discrimination
based on gender as well as sex. It stated that "for the purposes of these two
acts, the terms "sex" and "gender" have become interchangeable.""
This erasure of the distinction between the terms was influenced by the
Supreme Court decision in Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins.45 The case involved
a female senior manager who, upon being proposed for partnership, was the
subject of remarks by partners concerning her femininity, or lack thereof. As
Justice Brennan stated, "[tihere were clear signs ... that some of the partners
reacted negatively to Hopkins' personality because she was a woman.'
46
Hopkins was described by one partner as macho, another said that she
"overcompensated for being a woman," and she was advised by a third to take
"a course at charm school., 47 Her use of profanity was criticized and it was
42. See Schwenk, 204 F.3d at 1201.
43. Id. at 1201-02.
44. Id. at 1202 (emphasis added).
45. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989).




suggested that some partners objected to her swearing only "because it's a lady
using foul language." But the coup de grace was when she was advised to
"walk more femininely, dress more femininely, wear make-up, have her hair
styled, and wear jewelry., 48 Hopkins was denied promotion although her work
record surpassed those of other candidates, some of whom were found to have
equally abrasive interpersonal skills. Hopkins argued that she had been the
victim of sex stereotyping. The Supreme Court agreed, finding that her
employer's conduct constituted unlawful sex discrimination under Title VII.
In construing Title VII, Justice Brennan found that "Congress' intent to
forbid employers to take gender into account in making employment decisions
appears on the face of the statute. 49 In his view, Title VII must be taken to
mean that "gender must be irrelevant to employment decisions., 50 An example
he gave of an employer acting "on the basis of gender" by using sex stereotypes
is when "an employer.., acts on the basis of a belief that a woman cannot be
aggressive, or that she must not be.",51 Justice Brennan stated:
As for the legal relevance of sex stereotyping, we are beyond the day
when an employer could evaluate employees by assuming or insisting
that they matched the stereotype associated with their group, for '[i]n
forbidding employers to discriminate against individuals because of
their sex, Congress intended to strike at the entire spectrum of
disparate treatment of men and women resulting from sex
stereotypes.'
52
While the approach in Price Waterhouse appeared to be new, it was in fact the
culmination of stereotyping claims that began in the early 1970s.53 It
represented the first time, however, that the Supreme Court recognized that sex
stereotyping constitutes sex discrimination.
The Supreme Court judgment of Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services
Inc.54 was also influential on the Ninth Circuit's decision to depart from the
48. Id.
49. Id. at 239 (emphasis added). Justice Brennan stated: "We need not leave out common sense at
the doorstep when we interpret a statute." Id. at 241. The Supreme Court held that remarks such as
those quoted in the text constituted evidence of impermissible gender role stereotyping and that the
employer could avoid a finding of liability only by proving by a preponderance of the evidence that it
would have made the same decision based on a legitimate reason.
50. Id. at 240.
51. Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 250.
52. Id. at 251 (emphasis added) (quoting Los Angeles Dept. of Water and Power v. Manhart, 435
U.S. 702, 707 (1978)).
53. Varona and Monks argue that "the seed" was planted by the Supreme Court in Phillips v.
Martin Marietta Corp. 400 U.S. 542 (1971) when it first recognized "sex-plus" discrimination as being
actionable under Title VII. Anthony E. Varona & Jeffrey M. Monks, Engendering Equality: Seeking
Relief under Title VII against Employment Discrimination Based on Sexual Orientation, 7 WM. &
MARY J. OF WOMEN & L. 67, 76 (2000).
54. Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services, Inc., 523 U.S. 75 (1998).
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traditional Title VII jurisprudence in Schwenk. In this case, Oncale was the
subject of harassment by his male co-workers for not being a "real man." Here
the Court held that same sex discrimination is actionable under Title VII (as
long as the discrimination was on the grounds of sex-not sexual orientation)
despite the fact that nothing in Title VII's legislative history suggests that
Congress intended to cover such discrimination. Writing the unanimous
decision of the Court, Justice Scalia recognized that "statutory prohibitions
often go beyond the principal evil to cover the reasonably comparable evils,
and it is ultimately the provisions of our laws rather than the principal concerns
of our legislators by which we are governed., 55  Thus Title VII's sex
discrimination prohibitions must be construed broadly to cover "reasonably
comparable evils" such as discrimination involving same sex harassment and
sex stereotyping. This decision also indicates that the importance of
Congressional intent is only relative in the face of such "evils."
Following these cases, there appears to have been some confusion, in the
lower courts at least, as to how broadly the Price Waterhouse approach to sex
discrimination should be interpreted. In the case of Broadus v. State Farm
Co.,56 for example, Judge Wright of the U.S. District Court acknowledged the
sex stereotyping approach used in Price Waterhouse but stated: "It is unclear,
however, whether a transsexual is protected from sex discrimination and sexual
harassment under Title VII. In Price Waterhouse the plaintiff was not a
transsexual.
5 7
In contrast, the Price Waterhouse approach was applied with confidence by
the Appellate Division of the Superior Court of New Jersey in the explicitly
"transgender" employment discrimination case of Enriquez v. West Jersey
Health Systems.58  Here a pre-operative MTF transsexual physician was
confronted and questioned by her superiors about her transformed appearance,
and told by one superior to "stop all this and go back to your previous
appearance!, 59 Upon her refusal, her contract was terminated and her patients
were falsely informed that her whereabouts were unknown by the medical
center. The plaintiff made a claim under the "sex" discrimination provisions of
the New Jersey Law Against Discrimination (LAD), arguing that she had
suffered gender discrimination. The court dismissed the traditional Title VII
jurisprudence and found that the approach in Price Waterhouse, Schwenk, and
55. Id. at 76.
56. Broadus v. State Farm Ins. Co., 2000 WL 1585257 (W.D. Mo. Oct 11,2000).
57. Here the judge made no reference to Rosa or even the explicitly transgender case of Schwenk.
Note that the decision in the following case of Doe v. Yunits, infra, was handed down the same day as
Broadus, but the court in Yunits considered the cases of Rosa and Schwenk in detail. The question of
whether "sex discrimination" under Title VII covers claims by transsexuals was not taken any further by
the court in Broadus as the FTM transsexual complainant was unable to prove that his employer had
created a hostile work environment.
58. Enriquez v. West Jersey Health Systems, 777 A.2d 365 (2001), cert. denied, 170 N.J. 211 (N.J.
Oct 30, 2001).
59. Enriquez, 777 A.2d at 368.
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Rosa v. Park West Bank & Trust Co. 6 0 was more in line with the state's
61historical policy of liberally construing the LAD. It also approved the words
of Judge Handler in the family law case of MT. v. J.T.62 to the effect that the
term sex embraces the term "gender" in that it is broader than anatomical sex.
3. A "Canary in the Sartorial Coal Mine "?
The case of Rosa v. Park West Bank & Trust Co.,63 referred to above, was
not an employment discrimination decision but one dealing with the credit-
worthiness of a cross-dressing man. Here Lucas Rosa, a biological male
dressed in traditionally female attire, applied for a bank loan, only to be refused
unless she went home and returned in more traditionally male clothing. Rosa
made a claim for sex discrimination under the Equal Credit Opportunity Act
(ECOA) and various Massachusetts anti-discrimination statutes on the ground
that she had been required "to conform to sex stereotypes before proceeding
with the credit transaction." 64 At first instance the District Court held that the
matter was not one of Rosa's sex but of her choice of dress-and that the Act
does not prohibit discrimination based on the manner in which someone
dresses. Judge Freedman stated: "neither a man nor a woman can change their
status from unprotected to protected simply by changing his or her clothing.
65
The First Circuit reversed this decision, accepting Rosa's argument that the
District Court had misconceived the relationship between telling a customer
what to wear and sex discrimination. In interpreting the ECOA, the First
Circuit looked to Title VII. It found it reasonable to infer that Rosa had been
told to "go home and change" because her attire "did not accord with his male
gender" to mean that she was being treated differently from a similarly situated
woman-that is, a biological woman who dresses like a man. The court also
referred to Justice Brennan's judgment in Price Waterhouse that "stereotyped
remarks [including statements about dressing more "femininely"] can certainly
be evidence that gender played a part," thus implicitly accepting that Rosa had
been the subject of prohibited sex stereotyping under Title VII. 6 6 The court
remanded the case to a lower court to determine whether sex discrimination
was at issue.
Thus the First Circuit affirmed two bases of sex discrimination in relation
to effeminate men. First, there is a claim for sex discrimination where, but for
60. Rosa v. Park West Bank & Trust Co., 214 F.3d 213 (1st Cir. 2000).
61. Enriquez, 777 A.2d at 373.
62. 355 A.2d 204 (1976).
63. See Rosa, 214 F.3d at 213.
64. Id. at 214.
65. Rosa v. Park West Bank & Trust Co., No. 99-30085-FHF, slip op. at 1-2 (1st Cir. Mass. Oct.
18, 1999), cited in Katherine Franke, Lucas Rosa v. Park West Bank and Trust Company, 7 MICH. J.
GENDER& L. 141, 144 (2001).
66. SeeRosa, 214 F.3d at251.
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an individual's sex, the individual would not have been treated adversely.
Second, there is a sex discrimination claim where sex stereotyping has
produced adverse treatment. The court also affirmed the relation between sex
discrimination and clothing, a relation to which Judge Freedman was evidently
blind.
Of course this case can also be understood as a transgender case. Both
Rosa's brief and that of National Organization of Women (NOW) Legal
Defense and Education Fund and Equal Rights Advocates in support of Rosa
omitted the fact that Rosa is a transgender person in that she identifies herself
as female.67 This was presumably a strategic omission in that Rosa's case
preceded the decision of Enriquez, and it would thus have had to be viewed by
the court in the relatively uncertain and evolving frame of transgender case law
and the question of Congressional intent.
Rosa's case has been described as being a "canary" that has signaled a
change in the coal mine 68-i.e. a part of the recent jurisprudence (the approach
in Price Waterhouse, Schwenk, and Rosa) that has expanded the traditional
understanding of sex discrimination under Title VII. The strategic omission of
Rosa's transgender status may lessen the case's ultimate power as a precedent.
This is because it can be too easily distinguished from the other cases of Price
Waterhouse and Schwenk on the basis that it is a "cross-dressing" case. As a
more broadly stated transgender case it could have been of more instrumental
use in clearing the path for a larger number of gender stereotyping and
transgender claims. 6 9  Rosa has been followed by the Superior Court of
70Massachusetts in the "cross-dressing" case of Doe v. Yunits. In Yunits, Doe, a
fifteen year old biological male suffering gender dysphoria brought an
injunction against school officials for excluding her from school for "cross-
dressing": wearing traditionally female attire including "items such as skirts
and dresses, wigs, high heeled shoes, and padded bras with tight shirts." The
defendants alleged that Doe's clothing and behavior were disruptive and
distractive to the educational process, and that she was "known to primp, pose,
67. Franke, supra note 65, at 143, 47. See also Jennifer L. Levi, Paving the Road: A Charles
Hamilton Houston Approach to Securing Trans Rights, 7 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 5 (2000).
68. Franke has indirectly described Rosa's case as "a canary in the sartorial coal mine." Franke,
supra note 65, at 144.
69. While the court in Enriquez, 777 A.2d 365, did cite Rosa, 214 F.3d 213, it was not cited by the
Second Circuit in Simonton v. Runyon, 232 F. 3d 33 (2d Cir. 2000), or by the Ninth Circuit in Nichols v.
Azteca Restaurant Enterprises, 256 F. 3d 864 (9th Cir. 2001), despite the fact that these courts did refer
to Schwenk, 204 F.3d 1187.
70. Doe v. Yunits, 2000 WL 33162199 (Mass. Super. Oct 11, 2000). Jennifer Levi, who is a Gay
& Lesbian Advocates & Defenders (GLAD) Staff Attorney, was also counsel in this case. See also Lie
v. Sky Publishing Corporation, 5 Mass. L. Rptr. 412 (Mass. Super. Oct. 7, 2002) (finding the Schwenk
and Rosa line of reasoning "significantly more persuasive than the interpretations found in other federal
circuits"). The analysis in Rosa, Schwenk, and Hopkins in relation to trans-litigation has also been
accepted by the Connecticut Commission on Human Rights and Opportunities in the Declaratory Ruling




apply make-up, and flirt with other students in class."' 1 They argued that the
school's policy was gender neutral given that girls who wore items of male
attire, "such as a fake beard," would be treated in the same way. The
defendants relied on the traditional transgender jurisprudence to contend that
Doe was being discriminated against because of her gender and not because of
her sex.
The court in Yunits rejected the defendants' argument, stating that it failed
to "frame the issue properly." 72 It reasoned that because Doe identified herself
as female, the right comparator for Doe was a female student.73 Therefore, the
pertinent question is whether a female student would be disciplined for wearing
the traditionally female items of clothing described above; if not, Doe was the
subject of discrimination on the basis of her sex. The court found Doe's
reliance on Price Waterhouse, Rosa, and Schwenk to be persuasive authority.... 74
and held that Doe was likely to establish a case of sex discrimination.
The court in Yunits was unsympathetic to the defendants' argument that
such a code serves "important government interests, such as fostering
conformity with community standards., 75 Stating that it refused to allow "the
stifling of [Doe's] selfhood merely because it causes some members of the
community discomfort," the court suggested that students could benefit from
76being exposed to such diversity at an early age.
4. The Applicability of the Price Waterhouse Approach
As has become evident, the sex stereotyping and gender non-conformity
approach outlined in Price Waterhouse and Schwenk has recently become the
trend in trans litigation and commentary. This line of reasoning is apposite to
transgender plaintiffs because, by definition, their appearance, mannerisms and
behavior, which perform their psychological gender, do not match the social
stereotypes associated with their birth sex. 77 In addition, this trend has been
71. Yunits, 2000 WL 33162199, at *2.
72. See id. at *6.
73. In my view, the court in Yunits made better use of the "similarly situated" comparator test than
the court in Rosa where Rosa was compared not with the sex with which s/he identified, but with a
cross-dresser of the opposite biological sex. See Rosa, 214 F.3d 213 (1st Cir. 2000). This distinction was
probably due to the fact that Rosa's identification was not spelled out to the court. Compare discussion
infra Subsection 3 (describing how the ECJ uses this test and demonstrating, in my view, the loose
operation of this test of treating "likes" "alike").
74. On this basis the court allowed the injunction. See Yunits, 2000 WL 33162199, at *6. The
court also found that Doe was likely to establish that she had been denied her First Amendment right to
freedom of expression. Doe's dressing in traditionally female attire was seen as expressive speech,
understood by others (such as students and faculty) and suppressed by the defendants' conduct. See id.
at *34.
75. Id. at *7 (emphasis added).
76. Id. at *7.
77. This approach may be limited, in my view, in regards to gay and lesbian discrimination
claimants. In Rosa the court noted that if the bank employee had thought that Rosa was gay, the ECOA
would not be applicable. One commentator, Taylor Flynn, suggests all the same that Rosa is useful for
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applied to sex discrimination claims made by effeminate men who fail to
conform to stereotypes of "real men., 78  As Varona and Monks point out,
however, the courts have not consistently applied this approach. 79 It is arguable
that a more direct path for transsexual plaintiffs would be for courts to
acknowledge explicitly that discrimination because of a person's change of sex
constitutes discrimination "because of sex" under Title VII. However, this
approach would not protect transgender people such as Lucas Rosa and Doe
whose experiences of adverse treatment are unrelated to an intention to undergo
a surgical change of sex; indeed, there was no indication, for example, that
either Rosa or Doe intended to undergo such a change. Furthermore, such an
approach would not have the effect of denaturalizing the gender norms that
project femininity as the "real" and "natural" expression of femaleness (female
agency) and masculinity as the 'real" and "natural" expression of maleness.
All in all, the new sex stereotyping approach appears well tailored for
transgender claims of discrimination. There is no doubt that it improves on the
traditional transgender jurisprudence in that it engages and protects the
complexity of transgender identity. However, its path is not yet clear as only
gay and lesbian rights advocates because of the court's emphasis on the actionability of discrimination
based on gender-variance. Flynn, supra note 37, at 404. Such protection, in my view, would only be
available to those who fail to conform to male or female stereotypes and who project the mannerisms
and appearance of stereotypes in the gay community, such as the effeminate man, the drag queen or the
butch. Protection would not be provided under the Price Waterhouse line of reasoning to those gay men
and lesbians whose mannerisms and appearance either conform to male and female stereotypes or whose
experience of discrimination has no direct connection to their appearance and mannerisms but to the
mere fact of their sexual orientation.
78. In the pre-Price Waterhouse decision of DeSantis v. Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co., Inc., 608 F.2d 327
(1979), the Ninth Circuit held that Title VII does not protect from discrimination men who fail to be
-'real men" in that they exhibit traditionally feminine characteristics. The plaintiff was a nursery school
teacher who was fired for wearing an earring to work before the school term had commenced. He
argued, unsuccessfully, that the school's reliance on a stereotype-that a male should have a virile rather
than effeminate appearance-violated Title VII.
In the case of Higgins v. New Balance Athletic Shoe, Inc.. 195 F.3d 252 (1st Cir. 1999), the plaintiff,
who had suffered the mockery of his fellow workers in regards to his sexuality and effeminacy,
attempted to mount a claim of impermissible stereotyping but failed due to the fact that the First Circuit
perceived it as a "eleventh hour attempt" to present a new theory of sex discrimination. However, the
court noted, drawing on Oncale and Price Waterhouse, that it was now possible to confirm that "just as
a woman can ground an action on a claim that men discriminated against her because she did not meet
stereotyped expectations of femininity, a man can ground a claim on evidence that other men
discriminated against him because he did not meet stereotyped expectations of masculinity." Id. at 261,
n4. See also Simonton v. Runyon, 232 F.2d 33 (2nd Cir. 2000).
Most recently, the Ninth Circuit held in Nichols v. Azteca Restaurant Enterprises Inc., 256 F.3d 864 (9th
Cir. 2001), that the Price Waterhouse sex stereotyping approach did apply to the male plaintiff who
suffered harassment by his male co-workers and supervisor for failing to meet their views of a male
stereotype. In particular, the court held that Price Waterhouse had effectively overruled the decision in
De Santis.
Note that a plaintiff is able to argue that s/he suffered both discrimination on the basis of gender and
discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation. The Civil Rights Act of 1991,42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m)
(1994)), allows claims to be based on a "mixed motive." According to Price Waterhouse, this can be a
mixture of legitimate and illegitimate considerations. Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S., at 240; see Centola v.
Potter, 183 F.Supp. 2d 403 (D. Mass. 2002).
79. Varona & Monks, supra note 53, at 99.
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lower courts thus far have followed the circuit decisions of Rosa and Schwenk,
neither of which were Title VII cases.
B. Jurisprudence in the European Community
The courts of the European Community have an uneven record in their
approach to discrimination against transgender people. Generally, the approach
has been one of formal equality reached through broad principles of equality
and non-discrimination.
In the right-to-privacy and right-to-family cases of Rees v. United
Kingdom,80 Cossey v. United Kingdom,81 Sheffield and Horsham v. United
Kingdom,82 and X Y and Z v. United Kingdom the European Court of Human
Rights sanctioned the United Kingdom's strict biological approach to the
question of sex for the purposes of marriage and paternity law. According to
this approach, a person's birth sex is determinative for the purposes of marriage
and paternity law with the consequence that a person's gender reassignment or
"gender identity" has no bearing on their legal sex status in family law. Thus
sex and gender have effectively been set up as distinct concepts. Despite this
approach, the European Court of Justice (ECJ), in P. v. S. & Cornwall County
Council8 4 -one of the most applauded judgments dealing with transgenderism
and equality-held that gender reassignment surgery is a matter of "sex" and
hence any discrimination in the workplace in relation to such reassignment
surgery would constitute prohibited sex discrimination. This case can be seen
as adhering to a substantive notion of equality.
In this section, I first examine the court's approach in P. v. S. I then
compare this case with the approach taken in the subsequent case of Grant v.
South West Trains which involved a lesbian complainant. While P. v. S.
80. Rees v. United Kingdom, 106 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1986). See supra note 78.
81. Cossey v. United Kingdom, 184 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1990). See supra note 78.
82. Sheffield v. United Kingdom, 27 Eur. Ct. H.R. Rep. 163 (1998). In these three cases the
transsexual applicants were arguing that the United Kingdom had violated Articles 8 and 12 of the
European Convention of Human Rights, which respectively protect the right to respect for privacy and
the right to marry. The applicants, Rees, Cossey, Sheffield and Horsham, sought amendment of their
birth certificates to reflect their post-operative identities and the right to marry a person of the same
biological sex. They argued unsuccessfully that the United Kingdom violated these Articles of the
Convention due to its adherence to the Corbett (i.e. biology equals sex) approach that refused to
recognize their post-operative identity. See the most recent transsexual case of Goodwin v. United
Kingdom, [2002] 35 E.H.R.R. 18, where the court unanimously held that the United Kingdom was in
breach of Articles 8 and 12. However, the House of Lords has recently upheld the Corbett approach in
Bellinger v. Bellinger, [2003] U.K.H.L. 21 ,judgment delivered Apr. 10, 2003.
83. X, Y, and Z v. United Kingdom, II Eur. Ct. H.R. 619 (1997). Here the applicant was appealing
the extension of the Corbett approach into the realm of paternity law. X, a FTM transsexual, claimed
paternity under the Human Fertility and Embryology Act of his partner's child, which had been
conceived by means of artificial insemination donor. X unsuccessfully argued that the United
Kingdom's refusal to give him the same recognition as is given to biological men under the Act violated
his right to respect for family life under Article 8.
84. Case C-13/94, P. v. S. & Cornwall County Council, 1996 E.C.R. 1-2143 (E.C.J.).
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opened up the possibility of arguing broader gender discrimination under
provisions regarding sex, this option was blocked by the court in Grant, which
reverted to a strict legalistic approach, possibly due to its perception of
economic and moral concerns. I argue that despite the progressive decision in
P. v. S., this case did not set any pattern in the European Community's (EC)
jurisprudence and is therefore of minimal jurisprudential value. It does,
however, provide a useful point from which to compare the European approach
with those in the United States and Canada.
The facts in P. v. S. were that after working for a year for the defendant, P,
a MTF transsexual, informed her superior of her intention to undergo gender
reassignment. This would involve a "life test" where P would "dress and
behave as a woman" for a period followed by surgery. Before undergoing final
surgery P was informed of her dismissal. P claimed discrimination on the basis
of sex.
The English Industrial Tribunal initially heard the matter and held that such
a situation was not covered by the United Kingdom's Sex Discrimination Act
(as it then was).85 The Act applied only to cases in which a man or a woman is
treated differently because of their biological sex. Under English law, P had
not changed her sex-she was still deemed to be male. The Tribunal held that
P would have received the same treatment if she were a woman.
The question before the European Court of Human Rights was whether P's
dismissal was contrary to Article 5(1) of Directive 76/207/EEC, which provides
that "[a]pplication of the principle of equal treatment with regard to working
conditions, including the conditions governing dismissal, means that men and
women shall be guaranteed the same conditions without discrimination on
grounds of sex." 86 The United Kingdom argued that it did not constitute sex
discrimination to dismiss a person because they are a transsexual or because
they have undergone gender reassignment surgery. Furthermore, it asserted
that P's "similarly situated" comparator should be a FTM transsexual and that
85. After P. v. S. the U.K. introduced the Sex Discrimination (Gender Reassignment) Regulations
1999 (No. 1102 of 1999) pursuant to §2(2) of the European Communities Act 1972. They are intended
to extend the Sex Discrimination Act 1975 (SDA) to cover discrimination on grounds of gender
reassignment. They provide an exception where a person's sex is a genuine occupational qualification
for that job and the employer can show that his/her treatment is reasonable. See Employment Appeal
Tribunal decision, Chief Constable of West Yorkshire Police v. A. (No. 2); Chief Constable of West
Yorkshire Police v. Secretary of State for Education and Employment [2002] Industrial Relations Law
Reports 103, Lindsay J. (President), Employment Appeal Tribunal (holding that there was no
inconsistency between the Equal Treatment Directive and the supplementary exceptions to the sex
discrimination prohibition embodied in §7B(2)(a) of the SDA as introduced by the regulations). This
appeal dealt with the question of whether the latter provision (which made an exemption where the job
holder was "liable to be called upon to perform intimate physical searches") operated to constitute an
absolute ban upon the recruitment of transsexuals into the police force and was therefore inconsistent
with the Directive. The EAT held that the provision should be read in a purposive way and therefore, as
constables were not in practice "liable to be called upon to perform intimate physical searches," the
provision could not be read as barring transsexuals.
86. Article 5(1) of the Council Directive 76/207/EEC, 1976 O.J. (L 39/40) 2.
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the test should be whether the employer would have equally dismissed P if she
had previously been a woman.
The court responded by interpreting the Directive broadly as "simply the
expression ... of the principle of equality, which is one of the fundamental
principles of EC law.""7 It held that "the right not to be discriminated against
on grounds of sex is one of the fundamental human rights whose observance
the court has a duty to observe., 88  The court considered the scope of the
Directive and found that it was not confined to discrimination based on the fact
of one sex or another, but also applied to discrimination arising from the gender
reassignment of the person concerned.89  Critically, it stated: "Such
discrimination is based, essentially if not exclusively, on the sex of the person
concerned." 90  The court held that for the purpose of equality law a
transsexual's treatment must be compared with that of persons of the sex to
which he or she is deemed to belong before undergoing gender reassignment,91
which in P's case would have been the male sex.92  Thus it rejected the
submission that P should be compared with a FTM transsexual and held that P
had a claim for sex discrimination. In its view, to tolerate such discrimination
"would be tantamount.., to a failure to respect the dignity and freedom" of a
transsexual.9 3  Thus "sex" discrimination was interpreted as covering
discrimination against transitional transsexuals.
Significantly, the term "gender" was never used or discussed by the
court.
94  While the court referred to the broader principle of equality as an
underlying principle of EC law, its judgment was nevertheless cautious,
extending the Directive's "sex discrimination" prohibition only to the





92. The problem of finding a comparator was encountered in Sheffield v. United Kingdom. 27 Eur.
Ct. H.R. Rep. 163 (1998). Here two post-operative transsexuals unsuccessfully argued before the
European Court of Human Rights that they were victims of sex discrimination under Articles 8 and 12.
Article 12 protects against discrimination with respect to rights and freedoms set out only in the
Convention. In arguing that the U.K.'s refusal to allow the amendment of transsexuals' birth certificates
violated their right to respect for privacy under Article 8, the applicants pointed out that while they were
considered males under English law, unlike other males, they were required to disclose their pre-
operative sex to employers. They were thus arguing that they should be compared with non-transsexual
men. The U.K. submitted that the correct comparator here should be other transsexuals rather than non-
transsexual men. The court stated that the test was whether a person in an analogous or relevantly
similar situation enjoys preferential treatment. Critically, the court failed to elaborate as to which
persons were in this situation. Id. at 2031-2032. It failed to address the question of whether a
transsexual should be compared with a person of their biological or psychological sex--or a person who
wishes to have their birth certificate amended etc.
93. P. v. S., 1996 E.C.R. 1-2143 at2165.
94. Campbell and Lardy argue that P.'s argument "threw into sharp relief the question of the
distinction between sex and gender to analysis of claims of unlawful discrimination." However, in
finding that the facts constituted an instance of sex discrimination, the court did not need to answer this
question directly. Angus Campbell & Heather Lardy, Discrimination Against Transsexuals in
Employment, 21 EUR. L REv. 412,416 (1996).
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"dismissal of a transsexual for a reason related to a gender reassignment."
95
The decision was praised universally, with some commentators suggesting that
it had broader implications. For example, Campbell and Lardy praised the
decision as a "significant contribution to the developments of EC law on
fundamental rights. ' 96 They asserted that "the phrase 'on the grounds of sex'
now carries a much more expansive meaning than that previously attributed to
it."'97 They reasoned that:
[b]y ruling that it is unlawful for individuals to act on the basis of their
stereotypical prejudices regarding transsexualism, or their ignorance
about the phenomenon, the Court effectively reinforced the idea that
all individuals should be legally protected in their search for and
expression of a fitting sexual identity.98
They suggested that the decision "will also prove a very useful precedent
for those arguing legal protection against discrimination on the grounds of
sexual orientation."99 The English Industrial Tribunal observed this possibility
in a subsequent case where it stated that P. v. S. was "persuasive authority for
the proposition that discrimination on the ground of sexual orientation [was]
unlawful."' 00
The opinion of Advocate General Tesauro, who took a more broad and
philosophical approach than that of the court, may have encouraged such
comments. 10 ' The Advocate General began his analysis by noting that the
wording of the relevant principle of equal treatment refers to the traditional
man/woman dichotomy. He then considered the strong support in medical and
scientific circles for sex to be understood as existing on a continuum where
there is recognition of "a range of characteristics, behavior and roles shared by
men and women. ' 02 He compared this liberal trend with the law's approach:
95. P. v. S., 1996 E.C.R. 1-2143 at 2165. Note that the term "sex reassignment" was not used either
by the court nor in the U.K.'s submissions as summarized by the court, id. at 2164. In my view, this
would have been a strategic use of the term by the latter.
96. Campbell & Lardy, supra note 93, at 418.
97. Id. at415.
98. Id. at 417 (emphasis added).
99. In a footnote Campbell and Lardy state that it, "looks likely [to] have important implications for
those arguing for protection against discrimination on grounds of homosexuality." Id. at 417 n.25. See
also Leo Flynn, Case Note: P. v. S., COMMON MKT. L. REv., 367, 387 (1997).
100. The Tribunal made this observation when referring the case of Grant to the European Court of
Justice. See Case C-144/97, Grant v. South West Trains, 1998 E.C.R. 1-620, 641 (E.C.J.), infra.
101. Under Article 166 of the EC Treaty, the duty of Advocates General is to assist the court by
making reasoned and completely partial submissions on cases before the court. The Advocate General
sits with the judges and delivers his or her opinion once the parties have addressed the court and after an
adjournment. The opinion is printed alongside the court's judgment in the law reports. Lawyers often
use it to divine the likely decision of the court but, as seen in Grant discussed in text below, the court
does not always follow the opinion.
102. P. v. S., 1996 E.C.R. 1-2143 at 2153.
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its dislike for ambiguities and its desire "to think in terms of Adam and Eve."'
10 3
While he did not propose that the law follow this more liberal trend, he did urge
the law not to deny protection to those who are "discriminated against ... by
reason of sex, merely because they fall outside the traditional man/woman
classification."' 0 4 This traditional approach, he noted, is "taken too much for
granted" in courts in the United Kingdom and the United States.' 0 5 In his view
it constitutes "a quibbling formalistic interpretation and a betrayal of the true
essence of that fundamental and inalienable value that is equality.", 0 6 Such an
approach would imply that transsexuals constituted a "third sex."'
0 7
The Advocate General suggested that for the purposes of this case, "sex is
important as a convention, a social parameter."' 1 8 He continued by explaining
his view that women are frequently the subject of discrimination not due to
their physical differences but "rather to their role, to the image which society
has of women."' 0 9 In other words, sex is a social convention or construction
that requires women to play certain social roles that are not necessarily
connected to their physical characteristics. In the same way, "the unfavorable
treatment suffered by transsexuals is most often linked to a negative image, a
moral judgment that has nothing to do with their abilities in the sphere of
employment."" These views echo and elaborate on those of the recent U.S.
sex stereotyping approach.
The Advocate General also discussed the general operation of the
prohibition of discrimination on grounds of sex, which is part of the principle
of equality. He stated that for individuals to be treated alike, the principle
requires that no account be taken of distinguishing factors such as sex "so as to
influence, in one way or another the treatment afforded, for example, to
workers.""'1 He concluded by articulating his "profound conviction that what
is at stake is a universal fundamental value, indelibly etched in modem legal
traditions and in the constitutions of the more advanced countries: the
irrelevance of a person's sex with regard to the rules relegating relations in
society." 1
2
Critically, like the court, the Advocate General did not make any explicit
reference to the term gender. However, it can be argued that it was implicit in




106. Id. at 2154.




111. Id. at 2154.
112. P. v. S., 1996 E.C.R. 1-2143 at 2155.
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In the case that followed, Grant v. South West Trains,113 the court was
asked to extend sex discrimination to discrimination on the basis of sexual
orientation. In this case the complainant Lisa Grant challenged the refusal by
her employer to allow travel concessions to her same sex partner when such
concessions were allowed to other workers' (non-marital) partners of the
opposite sex. She argued that this constituted discrimination prohibited by
Article 119 of the Treaty or by Directive 75/117.114
The first question was whether the condition in the relevant regulations,
which required a spouse to be of the opposite sex in order to obtain travel
concessions, constituted sex discrimination. Grant submitted that her
comparator ought to be a man, pointing to the fact that the predecessor to her
job was a man whose female spouse was eligible for the concessions. She
argued that she was the victim of sex discrimination; as a female worker she
was not receiving the same benefits as a male worker. Grant asserted that she
be considered foremost as a woman rather than as a lesbian woman. By taking
this strategy Grant hoped that her case would be viewed as one of sex
discrimination rather than sexual orientation discrimination. Grant submitted
that, following P. v. S., discrimination "on the grounds of sex" should extend to
"differences in treatment based on sexual orientation [that] originate in
prejudices regarding the sexual and emotional behavior or persons of a
particular sex, and are in fact based on those persons' sex."'115 Effectively,
however, she was arguing a case of gender discrimination,' 16 asserting that the
social norm of "appropriate feminine behavior" determined that women should
be sexually attracted to men. The court completely rejected this logic and
decided to consider Grant as a lesbian woman, comparing her treatment with
that of a gay male employee, and thus making her case one of sexual
orientation discrimination.
The court emphasized that P. v. S. was confined to the case of a worker's
gender reassignment.'t 7  It refused to see Grant's case as one of sex
discrimination and it stated that the scope of Article 119 was to be determined
"only by having regard to its wording and purpose, its place in the scheme of
the Treaty and its legal context."' 18  The court thus rejected Grant's claim,
113. Case C-144/97, Grant, 1998 E.C.R. 1-620.
114. Article 119 of the Council Directive 75/117/EEC, 1975 O.J. (LA5) 19 (on the approximation
of the laws of the Member states relating to the application of the principle of equal pay for men and
women) is now numbered as Article 141 of The Treaty of Rome.
115. Grant, E.C.R. 1-620 at 644.
116. There is a commonly understood distinction between these terms, to which I do not subscribe.
In the debate as to the meaning of the terms sex and gender I subscribe to the view, expounded by Judith
Butler and Katherine Franke among others, that both sex and gender are culturally constructed concepts.
It follows that the two terms can be collapsed into one concept. See BUTLER, GENDER TROUBLE:
FEMINISM AND THE SUBVERSION OF IDENTITY (1990); Franke, supra note 8.
117. BUTLER, supra note 116, at650.
118. Id. at 651. Note that at the time of Grant, discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation was
not forbidden in any legally binding measure of the EC then in force. The Treaty of Amsterdam--
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finding that she had suffered the same treatment as would be suffered by a gay
male worker." 
9
In contrast, the Advocate General's opinion in Grant held that "the
essential point" in P. v. S. was "that the discrimination was based exclusively,
or essentially, on gender."'120  He construed Article 119 of the Treaty as
"covering all cases where gender is objectively the factor causing an employee
to be paid less.' 121 Furthermore, he viewed the discrimination in the relevant
Regulation as "exclusively gender-based. Gender is simply the only decisive- • - ,,122
criterion in the provision. 2 These views were clearly rejected by the court.
The Advocate General's use of the term "gender discrimination" should
not be understood as a matter of semantics but as a deliberate strategy to
broaden the traditional understanding of the term "sex."'' 23 By constantly using
the term "gender discrimination" in his opinion, Advocate General Elmer was
attempting to argue that the term is interchangeable with "sex discrimination."
He presumably recognized that the term is potentially broad enough to cover
male and female sex discrimination, discrimination against transsexuals, as
well as discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation. All of these forms of
discrimination involve societal assumptions or stereotypes as to how gender
and sex should be performed. Like Advocate General Tesauro in P. v. S., he
appears to be more willing to address some of the more complex issues at hand.
These two decisions of the court demonstrate its acute sense of caution, not
shared by the Advocates General, when addressing the question of sex
discrimination in equality jurisprudence. However, the approaches taken in the
two cases are quite different. In the later judgment, the court follows a very
narrow legalistic approach, focusing closely on the words, purpose and position
of the relevant Article rather than the broader issues of equality at stake. In
contrast, the court in P. v. S. took an unusual step, in terms of its own
jurisprudence, in considering the broader principles of equality before
examining the provisions and purposes of the Directives.
Before the judgment in Grant, it was argued by a number of optimistic
commentators that P. v. S. represented a shift away from the Aristotelian formal
Article 13 EC (where all member states' governments indicated the importance they attribute to the fight
against sexual orientation)-had not yet been ratified and was not yet in force. In Grant the court noted
that the Treaty "will allow the Council under certain conditions to take appropriate action to eliminate
various forms of discrimination, including sexual orientation." Id. at 651. For further discussion, see Iris
Canor, Equality for Lesbians and Gay Men in the European Community Legal Order-'they shall be
male and female, '7 MAASTRICHT J. OF EUR. & COMP. L. 273 (2000).
119. See Nicholos Bamforth, Sexual Orientation Discrimination after Grant v. South-West Trains,
63 MOD. L. REv. 694 (2000), arguing that the scope of Grant has been qualified by the European Court
of Human Rights decision in Smith v. United Kingdom [2000] 29 E.H.R.R. 493. Here, the court held
that the dismissal of gay and lesbian military personnel because of their sexual orientation violated
Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights.
120. Case C-144/97, Grant, 1998 E.C.R. 1-620 at 627.
121. Id.
122. Id. at629.
123. See BUTLER, supra note 116.
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approach to equality and the requirement that a comparator of the opposite sex
be used. 124 Commentators asserted that this shift indicated the court's move
towards a substantive equality approach based on disadvantage and detriment,
as used in Canadian jurisprudence.
An explanation for court's judgment in Grant lies in the economic purpose
of the EC. The EC's Directives are intended to enable market integration; the
objective of ensuring social progress is of secondary importance. In this
respect, some commentators have noted that in ECJ jurisprudence, social ideals
are always subject to economic ideals. For example, Ian Ward suggests that
ideals of social justice are rationalized as desirable if they will make the market
more productive. 12  This economic rationalist view can perhaps explain the
court's unwillingness to expand the definition of "sex" to cover sexual
orientation and its willingness to expand it to include transsexualism. As the
Advocate General's opinion in P. v. S. emphasized, transsexuals are statistically
an insignificant minority, and therefore the expansion of protection would be
unlikely to have a significant economic impact on employers in the EC.
1 26
However, it was noted in Advocate General Elmer's opinion in Grant that gays
and lesbians are a significant thirty-five million of the EC's population. 127 It is
possible that the court in Grant considered that a possible negative economic
effect would result from requiring employers to provide partner benefits to
homosexuals. Thus the court did not believe it was at liberty to further expand
the term "sex." This explanation for the different approaches employed by the
ECJ leads to the conclusion that P. v. S. should be considered as something of
an anomaly in ECJ jurisprudence, and thus cannot be seen as striking a new
path. This is partly evidenced in the EC's "trans" case law by the fact that it
made little impression on the European Court of Human Rights in its
subsequent decision in Sheffield and Horsham v. United Kingdom.' 28 Here the
court insisted on following the formal equality approach set out in Cossey v.
United Kingdom and Rees v. United Kingdom and made no reference to P. v. S.
or its comparator test, despite the fact that it was argued by the applicants.
Neither decision of the court gives an indication as to its understanding of
the aim of sex discrimination law in the EC. The court appears to prefer
dealing with discrimination questions in very simplistic categories as if social
identity were not a complex issue. For example, it refused to understand Lisa
Grant as both a female worker and a lesbian worker; she must be in one
124. Flynn, supra note 99, at 377-78; Catherine Bamard, P. v. S.: Kite-Flying or a New
Constitutional Approach, in THE PRINCIPLE OF EQUAL TREATMENT IN E.C. LAW 59, 61 (A. Dashwood
& S. O'Leary eds., 1997).
125. IAN WARD, A CRITICAL INTRODUCTION TO EUROPEAN LAW 166 (1996).
126. P. v. S., 1996 E.C.R. at 2149.
127. Grant, 1998 E.C.R. at 633.
128. 27 Eur. H.R. Rep. 163, 195-97 (1998). See also supra text accompanying note 92. P. v. S.
was, however, referred to in the most recent decision of the European Court of Human Rights, Goodwin
v. United Kingdom, [2002] 35 E.H.R.R. 18.
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category or the other. Despite its praiseworthy decision in P. v. S., the court's
sex equality jurisprudence is clearly at an embryonic stage.
C. Canadian Jurisprudence
The Canadian jurisprudence is similarly limited to a handful of decisions.
However, unlike the European Court of Justice, Canadian courts and tribunals
appear more willing to engage in issues involving the complexity of social
identity presented by transsexual claims of discrimination.' 29  Overall,
Canadian courts and tribunals are more prepared to consider and analyze how
other jurisdictions approach the same issues. For example, in the case of M.L.
v. Maison Des Jeunes 13  the Quebec Human Rights Tribunal undertook a
comprehensive comparative analysis, examining the recognition of
transsexualism in relevant sex discrimination law in Quebec, 131 the rest of
Canada, the United States, Europe, as well as international human rights law, in
deciding whether transsexuals' claims should be recognized under the term
"sex.' 132  In this case, the Tribunal was also ready to address some of the
129. For a summary and critique of Australian transgender discrimination law, see Andrew Sharpe,
Transgender Performance and the Discriminating Gaze: A Critique of Anti-Discrimination Regulatory
Regimes, 8 Soc. & LEGAL STUD. 5 (1999). Sharpe notes that the regulation of transgender persons in
Australia varies significantly. A slim majority of states have legislation which prohibits discrimination
on the ground of transgender. He notes that in some states, there are provisions prohibiting
discrimination on the belief that a person is of a particular sex. He argues that here the law seems to be
concerned primarily with the regulation of appearances. He asserts that the latter type of provision
marks a shift from an interrogative to a performative mode of regulation and that the central tension
appears to be between the legal desire to fix categories and the legal desire to regulate positively beyond
those categories. Id. at 15. Case law in Australia is confined to Menzies v. Waycott (2001) E.O.C 93-
129 at 75, 272. Here the Victorian Civil and Administrative Tribunal looked at the Equal Opportunity
Act 1995 (Vic) before it was amended in 2000 to include protection on the ground of "gender identity."
At paragraph 199 the Tribunal read the term "sex" narrowly to find that it did not cover the condition of
transsexualism.
130. (No. 2) [1998] 33 C.H.R.R. D/263 (Trib. Qud). Here, ML, the complainant, was employed as
a youth street worker. She alleged a violation of her right to be treated as "fully equal, without
distinction, exclusion or preference based on her sex or civil status" under the Quebec Charter of
Human Rights and Freedoms when her employment was terminated upon informing her superior of her
decision to undergo a sex change. This was despite the fact that until this point she had received good
work evaluations. The defendant employer argued that it acted in the interest of the youth for which it
cared, and for financial reasons in that possible negative public reaction could end funding for the public
community group employer. It argued that the terms "sex" and "civil status" do not cover
transsexualism or the process of changing one's sex.
131. Here the court briefly referred to the case of Quebec Human Rts. Commission v. Anglsberger,
[1982] 3 C.H.R.R. D/892 where a MTF transsexual successfully sued a restaurateur for refusing her
service due to her belief that the complainant was a prostitute. The Quebec Provincial Court found that
the complainant had suffered discrimination contrary to Art. 10 of the Charter because the respondent
has refused to recognize her civil status as a woman although she had all the characteristics of a person
of the female sex.
132. In construing "sex" under § 10 of the Quebec Charter, the Tribunal considered the
jurisprudence of the Supreme Court of Canada in relation to § 15(1) of the Canadian Charter. For
example, it drew on the judgment of Judge McLachlin in Miron v. Trudel, [1995] 2 S.C.R. 418,490-91,
where she affirmed the need to go beyond biological differences and examine social and economic
contexts in order to determine whether an impugned distinction "perpetuates the undesirable
stereotyping which § 15(1) aims to eradicate." The Commission found that, under § 15(1) of the
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theoretical issues surrounding transsexualism, sex, and sexual identity, opining
that it is "precisely in these areas that we can see the most tension between
what is known as 'sex and gender."",133  It stated that the relativity of these
concepts must be accepted before the condition of transsexuals can be
understood.
34
An interesting and illustrative stream of trans-litigation cases in Canada has
flowed from province of British Columbia. The first case in this stream was
Tawni Sheridan v. Sanctuary Investments Ltd. (d.b.a. B.J.s Lounge),135 where
the British Columbia Human Rights Tribunal ("the Tribunal") heard a sex
discrimination complaint made by a MTF transsexual who had been
undergoing the required "life test" to appear and behave like a woman, when
she was refused entry to a bar because her photo identity did not match her
attire and appearance. In addition, she claimed that on another occasion she
had suffered harassment by the bar's management regarding her choice of
washroom because she was not a "real woman." There was evidence that some
female customers of this lesbian bar expressed displeasure to management
about her choice of washroom. Sheridan claimed she had been discriminated
against because of "her sex (gender) and/or physical or mental disability."'
' 36
In determining whether "sex" can be interpreted to include transsexualism,
the Tribunal examined P. v. S., ML., and several U.S. decisions. The Tribunal
concluded that given the nature of the statute as a human rights statute, it
should be construed liberally so as to ensure that its objects are attained.' 37 It
stated:
Whether the discrimination is regarded as differential treatment
because the transsexual falls outside the traditional man/woman
dichotomy (as in P. v. S.), or because male-to-female transsexuals are
regarded a subgroup of females (and vice versa) (as in Maffei), the
Canadian Charter and § 10 of the Quebec Charter, the term 'sex' should be given a broad interpretation
and that its scope covered the plaintiff. It found that the plaintiffs rights had been infringed, (§ 4 and §
16 of the Quebec Charter) and it asserted: "it is not clear how discrimination based on transsexualism or
on the process of transsexualism could be anything other than sex based" (para. 115). The plaintiff was
awarded $4000 in compensation for moral injuries as well as damages for lost wages.
133. Miron, 2 S.C.R. at para. 88.
134. Id. at para. 99.
135. Sheridan v. Sanctuary Investment Ltd., [1998] 18 B.C.H.R.T.D. 464, [1999] 33 C.H.R.R.D.
D/467.
136. Id. at 464. Contrary to § 3 of the Human Rights Act, 1984 (now § 8 of the Human Rights
Code). Note that Sheridan applied to have her complaint amended to allege discrimination because of
her "gender identity," a ground not enumerated under the Code. Her claim was that the ground should
be read into the Code to bring it into compliance with the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. As
authority she referred to Vriend v. Alberta, [1998] 1 S.C.R. 493 and Cooper, [1996] 3 S.C.Rt at 854.
This argument was rejected by the Tribunal on the ground that it does not have jurisdiction to deal with
such complaints on grounds not included in the Commission's enabling legislation. Sheridan, 18
B.C.H.R.T.D. at 464.
137. [1999] 33 B.C.H.R.T.D. at para. 77.
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result is the same: transsexuals experience discrimination because of
the lack of congruence between the criteria which determine sex.'38
The Tribunal thus found that transsexualism should be covered under the
ground of "sex."' 139 It considered the bar's "neutral" washroom policy and held
that it had an adverse effect on transsexuals in transition and therefore that
Sheridan had suffered discrimination on the ground of sex in relation to the
washroom incident. 140  It found that the respondent's bar had "a duty to
accommodate transsexuals in general, and the complainant in particular, to the
point of undue hardship.' 4 1 However, the Tribunal rejected Sheridan's claim
of discrimination in relation to management's refusal of her photo
identification. It accepted that the refusal of her identification was made upon a
reasonable basis and that transsexuals were not being singled out for different
treatment in this respect. It held that, in regard to this matter, it was not
reasonable to expect that the complainant be accommodated given that she had
had ample time to obtain new identification papers. 42  Interestingly, the
Tribunal skirted the question posed by the respondent as to whether sex and
gender are synonymous terms.
This decision that the ground of "sex" includes transsexualism was
subsequently followed in Mamela v. Vancouver Lesbian Connection143 and
Ferris v. Office and Technical Employees Union, Local 15144 and challenged
138. Id. at para. 93. Clearly these criteria "which determine sex" were understood as comprising
more than biological factors (unlike Corbett). The Tribunal stated that for the purposes of human rights
legislation, transsexuals in transition who are living as members of the opposite sex should be
considered to be members of that sex. However, this does not mean that the same result will hold for the
purposes of other legislation (id. at paras. 107-108).
139. Id. atpara. 117.
140. Id. at paras. 102-11 1. Sheridan was awarded $2000 compensation in relation to the washroom
incident for injury to dignity, feelings and self-respect. Note that the defense argued "maintenance of
public decency" as a justification for its policy and submitted that a change of policy would create undue
hardship on customers. These arguments were rejected. The Tribunal held that the preference of
patrons was not a defense and further, that Sheridan's use of the women's washrooms did not interfere
with the "maintenance of public decency."
141. Id. at para. 102 (emphasis added).
142. Id. atparas. 112-117.
143. Mamela v. Vancouver Lesbian Connection, [1999] B.C.H.R.T.D. No. 51, 36 C.H.R.R. D/318,
2000 C.L.L.C. 230-008. In this case the pre-operative MTF transsexual complainant who identified as a
"lesbian female" successfully claimed that she was the victim of sex discrimination when she was asked
to leave the Vancouver Lesbian Connection ("VLC"), a women's only public organization whose
membership policy was based on self-identification. She was suspended from the VLC and prohibited
from entering its premises, ostensibly as a result of her disrespectful behavior and her stance, published
in a local paper, that "woman" is a socio-cultural construct that is offensive to all female persons. The
VLC did not make any submissions to explain the reasons for the suspension, as the organization was no
longer in operation. Tribunal Member lyer found that the complainant had been treated adversely and
that sex was a factor in this differential treatment. Id. at paras. 95-96. Iyer held that there was evidence
that members of the VLC disapproved of the complainant's self-identification as "female" and that this
was a factor in her suspension. lyer ordered the VLC to pay the complainant $3,000 in compensation,
should it resume operation.
144. Ferris v. Office and Technical Employees Union, Local 15 [1999] B.C.H.R.T.D. No. 55,
36 C.H.R.R. D/329, 99 C.L.L.C. 230-034. Here the pre-operative MTF transsexual complainant
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before the British Columbia Supreme Court in the case of Vancouver Rape
Relief Soc 'y v. British Columbia Human Rights Comm 'n.
14 5
In this last case, judicial review was sought by the Vancouver Rape Relief
Society ("the Society") to challenge the Tribunal's jurisdiction to hear a sex
discrimination complaint brought against the Society by a post-operative MTF
transsexual, Kimberly Nixon. In this application, the Society argued before the
British Columbia Supreme Court that the legislature had intended sex
discrimination to mean "an unjustified refusal of a benefit or the imposition of
a burden because one is a man or a woman, or because of social, economic or
political disadvantage associated with maleness or femaleness. ' 146 It asserted
that this intention to limit "sex" to male/female was partly evidenced by the
legislature's failure to include gender identity or transsexualism as enumerated
grounds of discrimination. The court rejected both of these arguments, stating
that there was no discernible pattern in the legislation that rebutted the court's
conclusion that the words "sex" and "gender" were used either randomly or
interchangeably. 147  It also rejected the idea that the legislature intended to
redress only male/female social, economic, and political issues. It stated that it
is settled law that such legislation should be approached purposively, with a
large and liberal interpretation so as to advance its objects. It declared:
To limit discrimination on the basis of sex to male/female issues places
a far too narrow limit upon the purpose and intent of the [Act]....
While Canadian courts have indeed looked to issues which concerned
the social, economic and political disadvantage of women in assessing
what conduct may amount to discrimination on the basis of sex, many
cases also reflect the less specific principle that human rights
legislation is intended to preclude and rectify the wrongful oppression
of the weak by the strong and the disadvantaged by the advantaged in
society. 1
48
successfully argued that her Union had discriminated against her because of her sex and disability. The
complaint arose out of the Union's actions following a complaint made regarding her use of the
women's washrooms at work. This led to harassment, hospitalization for depression, and her
resignation from the company after 19 years of employment. Tribunal Member lyer held: "it is
reasonable to infer that the Union treated the complainant worse than it would have treated another
Union member and that her status as a transsexual was a factor in the treatment." Id. at para. 103. In
this case the complainant also succeeded on the ground of disability. Id. at paras. 84-85. In addition to
compensation for lost wages, the complainant was also awarded $5000 for injury to her dignity, feelings
and self-respect.
145. [2000]75 C.R.R. (2d) 173,37 C.H.R.R. D/390, 2001 C.L.L.C. 230-009.
146. Id. at 186.
147. Id. at 187.
148. Id. (emphasis added). This is the approach established by the Supreme Court in the cases of
Andrews v. Law Society of British Columbia, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 143 and Egan v. Canada, [1995] 2 S.C.R.
513. For a lucid explanation of this "disadvantage" approach, see N. Colleen Sheppard, Recognition of
the Disadvantaging of Women: The Promise of Andrews v. Law Society of British Columbia, 35
McGILL L. J. 207 (1989).
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In concluding, the court held that the Tribunal had jurisdiction to hear Nixon's
complaint, and affirmed, in obiter, a liberal and extensive interpretation of the
term "sex."
Nixon's complaint of sex discrimination was subsequently heard by the
Tribunal amidst much public interest. 149 Nixon specifically alleged that she
had suffered discrimination on the basis of sex when the Vancouver Rape
Relief Society refused to employ her (as a volunteer rape counselor) and had
denied her a service customarily available to the public because of her sex.' 
°
The facts were that the Society had asked Nixon to leave a volunteer training
session to be a rape counselor when Nixon's transsexual status became
apparent. They believed that all counselors should have the experience of
oppression as a woman since birth, and that Nixon's presence conflicted with
its "women-only" policy.' 5 ' They disputed whether their exclusion of Nixon
had a discriminatory effect and pointed out that not all distinctions in treatment
made on the basis of difference constitute discrimination.
The Tribunal held that Nixon had established a prima facie case of
discrimination under the relevant code and that it was unnecessary for Nixon to
prove injury to her dignity.' 5 2 In reaching its decision, the Society examined
the relevant Code and its purposes, and the applicable principles to be drawn
from the jurisprudence of the Supreme Court of Canada in its interpretation of
§ 15(1) of the Charter, the equality provision. 53 It restated the general rule
that the same basic principles and definition of discrimination that apply under
§ 15(1) of the Charter, apply equally under human rights codes. The Tribunal
referred to Judge McIntyre's definition of discrimination in Andrews v. Law
Society of British Columbia15 4 as still holding sway. He said:
Discrimination may be described as a distinction... which has the
effect of imposing burdens, obligations, or disadvantages on such
individual or group not imposed upon others, or which withholds or
149. Nixon v. Vancouver Rape Relief Society, 2002 C.L.L.C. 230-009.
150. Nixon alleged that the Vancouver Rape Relief Society's action was contrary to the Human
Rights Code, R.S.B.C., ch. 210, §§ 8 and 13 (1996).
151. Note that following her gender reassignment surgery, Nixon's birth certificate was amended
pursuant to the Vital Statistics Act, R.S.B.C., ch. 479, § 27(1) (1996), to record her gender as female.
152. The Vancouver Rape Relief Society argued that in the case of Law v. Canada (Minister for
Employment and Immigration), [1999 S.C.R. 497, the Supreme Court extended the test for
discrimination to include a consideration of whether the differential treatment impinged on the
complainant's dignity. The Tribunal rejected this submission, holding that the court in Law did not
intend to alter or shift away from its twenty years of jurisprudence under human rights legislation, Nixon
v. Vancouver Rape Relief Society, 2002 C.L.L.C. 230-009 at paras. 109-24.
153. Section 15(1) of the Charter provides: "Every individual is equal before and under the law and
has the right to protection and equal benefit of the law without discrimination and, in particular, without
discrimination based on race, national or ethnic origin, color, religion, sex, age or mental or physical
disability."
154. Andrews, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 143.
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limits access to opportunities, benefits and advantages available to
other members of society. 155
Furthermore, the determination of whether a distinction involves prejudice
or disadvantage and thus amounts to discrimination is to be analyzed in a
contextual and purposive way. A purposive approach, according to the
Tribunal, takes into account "the full social, political and legal context of the
claim,"' 56  and aims to remedy "such ills as prejudice, stereotyping, and
historical disadvantage."'
157
In the Tribunal's view, it was "self-evident" that the type of exclusion
imposed on Nixon was prima facie discriminatory.158  The Tribunal also,
however, pointed to the evidence presented of Nixon's history of
marginalization and discrimination in the workplace and unemployment
market. 159 It concluded that Nixon's exclusion by the Society denied her the
opportunity to participate fully and freely in the [province's] economic, social,
political and cultural life ' 160 and that the Society's decision to exclude her
failed to take into account her already disadvantaged position within Canadian
society. It said, "They applied their stereotypical view that, despite her self-
identification as a woman, and her legal status as one, she was not a woman...
[The Society] made an assumption about Ms. Nixon that was not based on any
assessment of her individual capabilities or her life experience.
161
The Society was then required to prove that, upon a balance of
probabilities, its treatment of Nixon was justified in that it related to a bona fide
occupational requirement. Furthermore, it had the burden of proving that it
could not accommodate individual or group differences without experiencing
undue hardship. 162 Here the Tribunal examined the standards and policies used
by the Society and found evidence demonstrating that the Society's standards
assumed all its employees and service-users to have a "homogenous common
life experience."' 163 The Tribunal held that the Society failed to make any
gesture towards meeting its obligation of accommodating Nixon's difference to
the point of undue hardship.' 64 Nixon was subsequently awarded the highest
155. Id. at 147 (emphasis added).
156. Id. at 103.
157. Law v. Canada (Minister for Employment and Immigration) [1999] 1 S.C.R. 497, 524
(quoting the Supreme Court of Canada).
158. Id. atpara. 133.
159. Id. atpara. 134.
160. Id. at para. 143.
161. Id. at para. 144
162. This is part of the three-step test for justification set out by the Supreme Court of Canada in its
"unified approach" to all cases of discrimination under human rights legislation; see British Columbia
(Public Service Relations Commission) v. B.C.G.S.E.U. [1999] 3 S.C.R. 3 ("Meiorin"); British
Columbia (Superintendent of Motor Vehicles) v. British Columbia (Council of Human Rights) [1999] 3
S.C.R. 868.
163. Id. at para. 202.
164. Id. at paras. 204-07.
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sum of compensation for "injury to dignity, feelings and self-respect" by a
human rights tribunal in British Columbia.' 65 In addition, the Society was
ordered to cease denying transgender women access to its services and
employment programs.
From these cases it is clear that Canadian jurisprudence follows a
purposive approach to human rights legislation, similar to that used by the ECJ
in Europe. However, it is distinguished from this other approach by its focus
on broader questions of disadvantage-i.e. addressing the underlying reasons
why some groups do not currently enjoy equality and the effects caused by
certain acts (and legislation) on different groups. These reasons include social,
political, and economic issues. This is clearly a substantive equality analysis in
that the courts and tribunals look beyond the two-dimensional categories of
discrimination to consider the operation and effect of discrimination upon the
claimant in its dynamic context. In these cases it is also apparent that Canada's
human rights courts and tribunals do not use the "similarly situated"
comparator test.'
66
While a similar approach to this was arguably taken in P. v. S., it appears
from Grant that the ECJ generally approaches questions of discrimination by
making vague espousals of equality and construing provisions strictly with a
view to their economic impact. In Grant it used a narrow comparator test that
failed to address whether gays and lesbians occupy a social position of
disadvantage when they are the subject of rules and standards set up for
heterosexual workers. To be treated "the same" under these standards is clearly
meaningless unless some account is taken of difference. It is clear that this
"sameness" approach of the ECJ demands conformity to norms defined by the
characteristics of members of the dominant groups in society.
Like the Canadian approach, the recent sex stereotyping approach in the
United States also looks to the reasons for sex discrimination. It locates these
reasons in the non-conformity of gender performance: the failure to perform the
norms of how to behave or look like a "real woman" or a "real man." This sex
stereotyping approach, however, is limited in that it looks at claimants only as
individuals and not as members of a broader group which embodies differences
that challenge conventional gender norms. Moreover, it fails to consider or
address the claimant's history of social marginalization and economic
disadvantage. In other words, it stops short of addressing broader questions of
systematic and economic discrimination that would make the approach more
generally useful to other groups suffering from discrimination as such. Despite
the limitations of this approach, it is undoubtedly useful to transgender
claimants and the present nature of their claims. It is arguable that, out of the
165. The sum of $7,500 was awarded as compensation. The sum no doubt looks insubstantial to
lawyers in the United States and is in fact less than what other Canadian jurisdictions are awarding.
166. See the next section for more discussion.
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above approaches, the sex stereotyping approach used recently in the U.S.
courts best caters to such claims because it goes straight to the specific causes
of this type of gender discrimination.
However, before fully assessing and embracing any single approach to
anti-discrimination law as providing the best avenue for transgender
discrimination claims, it is important to consider the general aims, operation
and effect of each approach to anti-discrimination law. This consideration,
which I undertake in the next part of this paper, will enable a better
understanding of these varying approaches to discrimination.
II. THE AIMS, OPERATION, AND EFFECTS OF ANTI-DISCRIMINATION LAW
A. The Aim ofAnti-Discrimination Law?
In Price Waterhouse Justice Brennan stated that the words "because of
sex" in Title VII should be "taken to mean that gender must be irrelevant to
employment decisions." 167 He explained:
In passing Title VII, Congress made the simple but momentous
announcement that sex, race, religion, and national origin are not relevant to the
selection evaluation, or compensation of employees. Yet the statute does not
purport to limit the other qualities and characteristics that employers may take
into account in making employment decisions. 1
68
Justice Brennan illuminated the fact that anti-discrimination law sought a
balance between employee rights and employer prerogatives. Anti-
discrimination law aims to make qualifications and work performance the
controlling factors. Thus the test is to measure the person against the job
requirements, not the person in the abstract. This aim is motivated by a liberal
view of equality that posits that all persons inhere the same degree of human
dignity and therefore deserve equal respect, regardless of their particular
characteristics. This is also spelled out by a New Jersey court: "Distinctions
must be made on the basis of merit, rather than skin color, age, sex or gender,
or any other measure that obscures a person's individual humanity and worth.
This case represents another step toward achieving what has thus far been an
elusive goal.' 69
Effectively, therefore, United States anti-discrimination law aims to make
certain signs of difference irrelevant in specific circumstances, such as
treatment in the workplace. It aims to protect difference by demanding that
employers be blind to such differences.
167. Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 240.
168. Id. at 239.
169. Enriquez v. West Jersey Health Systems, 777 A.2d 365, 380 (N.J. Super. 2001).
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This description of the aims of United States anti-discrimination law
appears to mirror the aims of European Community Equality Directives
concerning sex discrimination. As discussed above, these Directives stipulate
"the irrelevance of a person's sex with regard to the rules relegating relations
in society" and, in particular, the treatment afforded to workers. 70 Both share
the same approach of making certain signs of difference irrelevant.
The ideal of eliminating difference is certainly one that has been
immensely important in the history of emancipatory politics. It has been
crucial in the struggle of women and racial minorities, for example, against
exclusion and status differentiation. 171  However, this ideal carries certain
dangers in its desire to eliminate difference rather than positively to affirm
difference. This approach encourages assimilation in that formerly excluded
groups must prove themselves according to rules and standards that have
already been set.1
72
The Canadian approach takes a slightly different tack. It aims to eliminate
the disadvantage suffered by oppressed groups through the accommodation of
their differences, rather than the elimination of the differences embodied by
these groups. Canadian anti-discrimination law draws its principles from the
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, in particular § 15(1). The dominant
interpretation of § 15(1) by the Supreme Court of Canada rejects the "similarly
situated" test used by the E.C.J. as frequently producing serious inequality.
173
It holds that § 15(1) does not intend to eliminate all distinctions and points out
that certain sections of the Charter are designed to safeguard certain
distinctions. 174 It is arguable that the purpose of the section is similar to that of
Title VII. For example, the court in Miron v. Trudel stated that the equality
provision aims: "to prevent the violation of human dignity and freedom by
imposing limitations, disadvantages or burdens through the stereotypical
application of presumed group characteristics rather than on the basis of
individual merit, capacity or circumstance. ' ' 175  Nevertheless, the means
employed to prevent such disadvantage are different. The court has critically
stated that "the accommodation of difference ... is the essence of true
equality."'
176
This approach to equality arguably allows an oppressed group to assert a
positive sense of group difference as a means to emancipation. This approach
is preferable from a theoretical point of view in that it does not have an
assimilationist drive to treat everyone the same according to the same
170. P. v. S., [1996] E.C.R. at 2155 (Tesauro, Advocate Gen.) (emphasis in original).
171. IRIS MARION YOUNG, JUSTICE AND THE POLITICS OF DIFFERENCE 159 (1990).
172. Id. at 164.
173. Andrews v. Law Society of British Columbia, [1989] 1 S.C.Rt 143, 166-68.
174. Id. at 171.
175. Miron v. Trundel, [1995] 2 S.C.R. 418, 486-87.
176. Andrews, I S.C.R. at 169.
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principles, rules, and standards. Instead its focus on disadvantage and
difference appears to preserve the conditions in which individuals and groups
can assert and express their differences.
This alternative Canadian approach raises the question whether the best
strategy is to protect difference-such as gender non-conformity-through its
conceptual elimination. How far should American anti-discrimination law
pursue this aim of transcending and erasing difference in the name of equality
in the workplace? A further question is whether such law is in fact able to truly
transcend difference. One legal theorist, Robert Post, addresses these very
questions.1
77
In the next section I consider Post's observations and suggestions regarding
the aims and potential of American discrimination law. This is with a view to
exploring specifically the problems with the United States' approach to
discrimination law, and more broadly, how the law constructs identity in
relation to difference. Does it, for example, entrench stereotypes when it
produces identity categories? Are gender norms in fact reinforced by such anti-
discrimination discourses?
1. Is Anti-Discrimination Law Able Truly to Transcend Difference?
To examine the implications of the American approach, Post takes as an
example a Santa Cruz discrimination ordinance that, among other things,
prohibits discrimination in employment on the basis of personal appearance.
The ordinance, dubbed by the media as the "ugly ordinance," refers to
appearance by using the term "physical characteristic" which is defined as
including "a bodily condition or bodily characteristic of any person which is
from birth, accident, or disease, or from any natural physical development, or
any other event outside the control of that person including individual physical
mannerisms." In this definition the ordinance significantly omits clothing, hair
color, and tattoos, and allows an exception in circumstances where appearance
is proven to be relevant to job performance. Supporters of the ordinance assert
that it merely forbids superficial judgments upon stereotypes and emphasize
that it is aimed at equal opportunity as well as personal autonomy, self-
expression, and fairness.
Post is critical of this ordinance because it attempts to eliminate or
transcend parts of one's personhood, such as appearance, which, in his view,
cannot be transcended. He argues: "the Santa Cruz ordinance demands that
employers interact with their employees in ways that are blind to almost
everything that is normally salient in everyday social life."' 78 He finds such
177. Robert Post, Prejudicial Appearances: The Logic of American Antidiscrimination Law, 88
CAL. L. REv. 1 (2000).
178. Id. at 11.
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ordinances unsettling because "they seem to preclude any ordinary form of
human interaction., 179 In his view, such ordinances abstract away so much
from the employee that "with respect to the employer, the employee is
transported into something like what John Rawls has called an 'original
position' behind a 'veil of ignorance."" In other words, Post rejects a
disembodied view of the person. Given anti-discrimination law's liberal
impulse, he finds it ironic that it should ultimately "unfold itself according to
the logic that points unmistakably toward the instrumentalization of
persons. '"'' By this he means that persons would be valued solely for their
capacity; ontology would be collapsed into capacity.
Post believes that this instrumentalization of persons is part of the
dominant conception of anti-discrimination law. He is skeptical of its claim
that it is possible to truly eliminate or transcend certain characteristics. Claims
to such power he finds unrealistic and misleading. More critically, however, he
suggests that this dominant conception operates to undermine "the law's
coherence and usefulness as a tool of transformative social policy.'
182
2. Post's Proposal of a Sociological View ofAnti-Discrimination Law
Post argues that a "sociological" view should be taken of anti-
discrimination law. Anti-discrimination should understand persons as social
beings and not as persons who can be stripped of their embodiment to become
an instrumental capacity. In contrast, the dominant approach assumes that the
person ontologically pre-exists the social, and that it is thus possible to deny the
social. The sociological view is that the social, including appearance, is central
to personhood. The person is, for example, fundamentally defined by his or her
appearance; the concrete way in which a person appears in the world is central
to their value and meaning as persons. Thus difference (in appearance,
behavior, etc.) is not a superficial layer, but is critical to identity.
In arguing for a sociological view, Post advocates that anti-discrimination
law should be understood not as a practice that is capable of transcending and
denying the salient factors of one's social existence, but as "a social practice
,183which regulates other social practices." These "other social practices" are,
for example, those of gender and race. These are the social practices that the
dominant conception aims and purports to eliminate. Post recognizes that anti-
discrimination law is a critical site where the meaning of social practices such
as gender become contested. For this reason, he argues, anti-discrimination law
can be used as a site to reshape these practices and meanings "in ways that
179. Id.
180. Id. at 15.
181. Id. at 16.
182. Post, supra note 177, at 16.
183. Id. at 17.
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reflect the purposes of the law."'18 4 Post's sociological approach does not seek
to eliminate these social practices but focuses instead on how the law
reconstructs them. It asks how the law could "alter" and "modify" such
conventions and practices.
To exemplify his argument that anti-discrimination law has the potential to
alter and modify conventions and practices, Post examines some of the Title
VII cases dealing with gender and appearance, specifically the grooming and
dress code cases. In his view these are important cases because the norms of
appearance are "pervasive" in the constitution of gender. 185  Absent a
knowledge or display of genitalia, it is generally one's appearance and behavior
that establishes one's sex in society. In the dress code cases Post finds that
courts generally hold that there is no discrimination "because of sex" when
male and female employees are made to conform to different dress codes or
where the required dress standards conform to community accepted dress
standards. But discrimination is found where, for example, women are required
to wear uniforms while men are allowed to wear business suits. In the
grooming cases he finds that the courts condone employers' imposition of sex-
based stereotypes so long as these stereotypes conform to traditional gender
conventions. Those persons who present themselves in ways that violate
established gender grooming and dress conventions are framed as asserting a
"personal preference" to flout accepted standards. He states: "Courts therefore
read claims for protection by those who deviate from gendered appearance
norms as ultimately asserting a right autonomously to present oneself 'in a self-
determined manner,' rather than a right to fair and equal treatment."' 186 In his
view, these cases nicely illustrate law's negotiation and shaping of gender
norms, and demonstrate that "courts are continuously re-evaluating which
stereotypes should be permitted, in what contexts, and for what reasons."'1
87
However, he argues, under the dominant conception of anti-discrimination law,
this negotiation and acceptance of explicit gender categories is not
acknowledged.
88
Post argues that it is implausible to read Title VII as mandating that the
social practice of gender be eliminated. He argues that it can instead be used to
alter the meaning of various conventions of the social practice of gender, such
as the connection between women and physical weakness. He states that if it
were thus interpreted:
[It] would in the context of employment require us to sever the
connection between gender and some capacities, such as strength, but
184. Id. at 16.
185. Id. at 26.
186. Id. at34-35.
187. Post, supra note 177, at 34-35.
188. Id. at 37-38.
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not to eliminate gender as such. In contrast to the dominant
conception, this way of conceptualizing the statute would not require
us to imagine a world of sexless individuals, but would instead
challenge us to explore the precise ways in which Title VII should alter
the norms by which sex is given social meaning.189
Post's "sociological" argument is very engaging and appealing. Post's
proposed sociological view recognizes the complexity of identity-the fact that
differences cannot be eliminated as if taking off layers of clothing. It is useful
in confirming that the aims of the U.S. approach suffer from fundamental flaws
and in recognizing that anti-discrimination law is a site where the meaning of
differences is contested. However, his proposal that it can be used to reshape
the meaning of these differences and other social convention presents an overly
idealistic view of the social practice of the law.
This skepticism of the operation of the law is shared by Judith Butler, who
writes a direct response to Post's argument. While she acknowledges that anti-
discrimination law is ideally "a social practice that seeks to disrupt and
transform another set of discriminatory social practices," she cautions that it
"can become an instrument of discrimination in the sense that it must
reiterate-and entrench-the stereotypical or discriminatory version of the
social category it seeks to eliminate."' 90
3. Butler: Does Anti-Discrimination Law also Entrench Stereotypes?
Butler's comments allude to the possibility that Post places too much faith
in the institutional instrument of the law to effect positive transformation. As
Post himself points out, "Law is made by the very persons who participate in
the social practices that constitute race, gender, and beauty."' 191 As we saw
from the case law in the United States, anti-discrimination is just as able to
regulate social practices that sustain group inequality as equality. Should
feminists and transgender people put their energy and hope in the law to
reconstruct and redetermine the social practice of gender? Is there not a danger
that the law will continue to reiterate and entrench stereotypical views of the
social practice of gender? For example, the enforcement of gender specific
dress and grooming codes using anti-discrimination law is highly selective and
inconsistently applied (like transgender case law), a fact acknowledged by Post
in his survey of the dress and grooming case law. Anti-discrimination law only
189. Id. at 20. This interpretation of Title VII and its transformative potential is partly shared by
Mary Anne Case who recommends that the next "generation" of stereotyping cases should target the
stereotyping of jobs and job requirements, rather than the stereotyping of job applicants. See Mary Anne
C. Case, Disaggregating Gender from Sex and Sexual Orientation: The Effeminate Man in the Law and
Feminist Jurisprudence, 105 YALE L. J. 1,76 (1995).
190. Judith Butler, Appearances Aside, 88 CAL. L. REV. 55, 62 (2000).
191. Post, supra note 177, at 17.
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constrains and de-legitimates some social practices of gender that are based on
sex stereotypes.1
9 2
Reva Siegel is also doubtful of the law's willingness to transform or
disrupt. In her response to Post, she points out that "even if the 'dominant
approach' masks the actual operations of anti-discrimination law, judges and
other legal decision makers may not necessarily wish to divest themselves of
some of their status privileges." In her view, anti-discrimination law is "a story
told by members of relatively privileged groups explaining why they are
prepared voluntarily to divest themselves of some of their status privileges."'
193
Critically, Post fails to clarify what "the purposes of the law" are, in his
nebulous assertion that anti-discrimination law can be used as a site to reshape
these practices and meanings "in ways that reflect the purposes of the law."
Post also fails to recognize that some feminists, for example, may believe that it
is better to aim for the elimination of socially constructed differences, such as
stereotypes and generalizations, rather than their "alteration" and
"modification" by the law. It is possible that the outcome of such alteration
could be more dangerous.
Post also comes under fire for his view of the social practice of gender. In
the following section I consider the comparison between his view of gender and
that of Catherine MacKinnon. This leads to an examination of the space that
transgender difference symbolically occupies in this social practice and why it
is important that transgender difference be affirmed rather than conceptually
eliminated within discrimination law. I then argue that whatever approach to
transgender discrimination law is embraced, whether it be the U.S. approach or
the Canadian approach, it will be encumbered by the law's demand that
differences conform to law categories, and law's insistence on defining
difference according to its own fictions. In explicating this last point I discuss
the attempt by MacKinnon to encode "women's collective experience" into the
law. With the assistance of Wendy Brown's insights, I argue that this effort
highlights the dangers in placing confidence in the law and its categories to
reflect difference as experienced by individuals and groups such as transgender
people.
4. Butler, Post, and MacKinnon: Stereotyping and the Social Practice of
Gender
Butler takes issue with Post's view of the social practice of gender, which
he explains thus:
192. Reva Siegel, Discrimination in the Eyes of the Law: How "Color Blindness" Discourse
Disrupts and Rationalizes Social Stratification, 88 CAL. L. REV. 77, 78 (2000).
193. Id. at 115.
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"Generalizations" and "stereotypes" of this kind [i.e. about real and
fictional differences between men and women] are, of course, the
conventions that underwrite the social practice of gender. To eliminate
all such generalizations and stereotypes would be to eliminate the
practice. This ambition reflects the goal of the dominant conception,
which is to disestablish the category of sex and to replace it with the
imperatives of functional rationality. 
94
Butler reads Post as asserting that to eliminate all gender generalizations and
stereotypes would be to eliminate the practice of gender. In her view, he
confuses some basic issues. For example, Butler's own political project,
broadly speaking, could be described as aiming to shift current gender norms
and stereotypes from their dominant and normalizing position in the social
practice of gender, through the process of denaturalizing and disempowering
them. This does not mean, however, that she is necessarily an advocate for the
elimination of gender as a social practice altogether. Butler therefore criticizes
Post's conflation of these two projects.
195
Butler also takes Post to task for implying, in the above quotation, that the
practice of gender is "underwritten" by generalizations and stereotypes and that
it is thus exhausted by them. 196 She questions whether the practice of gender
must be coextensive with its stereotype. In her opinion, such views of gender
are limiting in that they do not account for the existing deviations from the
norm. Such views are espoused by feminist theorists such as Catherine
MacKinnon.
MacKinnon, for example, sees gender as a social construct totally
constituted by male power and domination. In Towards a Feminist Theory of
the State she describes gender roles as thoroughly imbued with male power and
she conflates gender with sexuality in that sexuality, expressed in the
male/female relation, is the stuff of gender. Discussing the "content of gender
roles" she states:
All the social requirements for male sexual arousal and satisfaction are
identical with the gender definition of "female." All the essentials of
the male gender role are also the qualities sexualized as "male" in male
dominant sexuality.
... Gender and sexuality, in this view, become two different shapes
taken by the single social equation of male with dominance and female
194. Post, supra note 177, at 18.
195. Post responds that it depends on your understanding of "stereotype"-in his view they do not
exhaust the practice of gender, because any given stereotype is susceptible to change and transformation,
in exactly the same way that the meanings of words are susceptible to change. But then he says that
altering a stereotype merely revises it rather than eliminates it. See Robert Post, Response to
Commentators, 88 CAL. L. REV. 119, 121 (2000).
196. Butler, supra note 190, at 61.
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with submission. Feeling this as identity, acting9it as role, inhabiting
and presenting it as self, is the domain of gender.
Gender is thus not constituted by a set of norms, some of which are
unconsciously negotiated by the individual in order to deviate from the above
model. Instead, gender, in MacKinnon's view, is a form of power that is all-
enveloping-it allows one model, that of dominance and submission, which the
individual feels, acts, inhabits, and presents-but never negotiates, disrupts, or
transforms. In the context of "societies pervaded by pornography," which she
sees as the matrix of women's subordination in sexuality-gender relations, she
states that "all women are defined by it: this is what a woman wants: this is
what a woman is."1 98 Furthermore, she rejects the idea that there can be any
true subversions or deviations from this dominance/submission model. She
asserts that "the capacity of gender reversals (dominatrixes) and inversions
(homosexuality) to stimulate sexual excitement is derived precisely from their
mimicry or parody or negation or reversal of the standard arrangement."
199
Lesbian sex, therefore, is a mere imitation of heterosexuality; it does not
transcend the dominance/submission model associated with masculinity and
femininity.
As one commentator points out, MacKinnon's theory of gender "mirrors,"
rather than deconstructs, the subjects of male heterosexual pornography by
basing itself on the dominance/submission model. It thus encodes into the law
the dominance/submission model used by pornography "as the truth rather than
the hyperbole of gender production. 200 In other words, MacKinnon's theory
of gender appears to reiterate and entrench the same sex stereotypes that the
heterosexual male pornography industry produces. More critically, however,
her theory forecloses on the idea that there is space in which these
dominance/submission model stereotypes can be transcended. Only through
the instrument of the law and rights discourse can inequalities be exposed and
redressed in MacKinnon's view. Her theory is that law can be an instrument of
emancipation for women.
Not surprisingly then, MacKinnon has no interest in questions of gender
identity and gender fluidity and dismisses them as a worthless avenue for
feminism to pursue. This avenue, she argues, "situates women's problem in the
wrong place" in that it impliedly fails to provide "access to the reality of our
collective experience in order to understand and change it for all of us in our
197. MACKINNON, TOWARD A FEMINIST THEORY OF THE STATE 143 (1989).
198. Id. at 247.
199. Id. at 144.




own lifetimes."' 2 ' MacKinnon's project for change appears to involve
encoding the law with "the reality of [women's] experience."
In Butler's view there is more to gender than stereotypes and
generalizations. She asks: "is there a dimension of gender that is not only anti-
stereotypical... but is astereotypical... ? How do we account for the
transformation of the stereotype within the practice of gender if there were not
something else in gender, as it were, that is not immediately co-opted or
foreclosed by the stereotype?" It is critical for Butler that a space is understood
to exist in the social practice of gender for the "astereotypical." Butler locates
this space by looking at anti-discrimination law, which she notes is often
invoked by those who suffer specific forms of gender discrimination because of
their non-stereotypical expressions of gender. Butler sees the transitional
transsexual, for whom sex is not precisely a stable or systematic social
category, as the disruptive element in the social practice of gender norms. For
her, the transitional transsexual embodies the space or fissure outside the
stereotypes and generalizations that dominate the social practice of gender. She
sees their "asystematic appearance" as having "a transformative effect on the
norm itself' such that gender is "never the same again. 20 2
Arguably, under the transgender discrimination case law, the
"astereotypical"-the "disruptive element" and its "asystematic appearance"-
can now be protected by anti-discrimination law in that transgender persons
may no longer be required to conform their appearance, conduct, and behavior
to gender stereotypes under the recent U.S. stereotyping approach discussed
above. Under Title VII, those individuals who deviate from stereotypical
expectations must be treated the same as those who fulfill stereotypical
expectations. But what does this "victory" mean? What happens when such
anti-discrimination law regulates the "astereotypical"? Butler sees the
astereotypical as having the potential to transform the stereotypical, but at the
same time she cautions, as mentioned above, that anti-discrimination law "can
become an instrument of discrimination in the sense that it must reiterate-and
entrench-the stereotypical or discriminatory version of the social category it
,203seeks to eliminate." Butler is here referring to the implications of law's
regulation and recognition of difference and identity.
A critical question is whether in fact the "astereotypical" is protected under
U.S. sex discrimination law. Butler's work helps to highlight some of the
possible dangers in the sex stereotyping approach, which Post and others
should consider. First, in its articulation that certain appearance, conduct, and
behavior do not conform to conventional sex stereotypes, the law is effectively
reiterating these stereotypes, and possibly entrenching them at the same time as
201. MacKinnon, Points Against Postmodernism, 75 CHICAGO-KENT L. REV. 687,691 (2000).
202. Butler, supra note 190, at 62.
203. Id.
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ostensibly disempowering them. The reiteration of these stereotypes enforces
the idea that a "real woman" or a "real man" exists, rather than being a
historical and cultural fiction (such as in MacKinnon's work). Furthermore,
courts do not always reiterate such stereotypes to negate them. They are
selective in the stereotypes they seek to transform or eliminate and often
effectively empower them. However, the main problem in this approach's
regulation of the "astereotypical" is that it ultimately aims to eliminate it. This
aim to eliminate differences such as gender non-conformity is a concern, even
if such an aim may be an impossible ideal. More confidence can be placed in
an approach that aims to accommodate and affirm differences such as gender
non-conformity. Such an affirmation may allow a desired shift in gender
norms and stereotypes and the possibility of broader transformation.
Before concluding that we ought to embrace a legal approach that
accommodates and affirms difference-possibly presented by the Canadian
approach-it is critical to examine the inherent dangers in installing identity
and difference in the law. Groups and individuals seeking emancipation
through discrimination law must be aware of the possible effects when law and
its categories are encoded with their difference.
CONCLUSION: THE DANGERS OF INSTALLING IDENTITY
AND DIFFERENCE IN THE LAW
The work of Wendy Brown assists in illuminating these dangers,
Influenced by Foucaultian analyses, Brown advises caution to those, such as
transgender people, women, and Post, who turn to the state for emancipation.
She poses the question: "How does the nature of the political state transform
one's social identity when one turns to the state for political resolution of one's
subordination, exclusion, or suffering? ''204 The problem, in her view, is that
such law attempts to transform the astereotypical into the normal, into
something "normativizable through law."205 This has the effect of reducing
persons to observable social attributes "as if they were intrinsic and factual,
rather than effects of discursive and institutional power.' '2°6 These attributes
then become written into the law, which ensures that those who fit their
description will from then on become regulated through them and fixed by
them. Thus differences, which are in fact the effects of social power, become
neutralized and depoliticized. In other words, they are stripped of their
subversive power.
Some transsexual theorists, such as Jay Prosser, may assert that this is
precisely what transitional transsexuals desire-for their social difference to be
204. BROWN, supra note 200, at 100.




socially neutralized. Prosser is not interested in subverting the dominant
paradigm, but in finding recognition for his "right to a gender home" within
that paradigm. 207 In the neutralization of difference, transitional transsexuals
are given the right to protection from discrimination in the workplace, and
hence the ideal of assimilation becomes part of their road to emancipation. But
some commentators, such as Post, doubt that such neutralization or elimination
of difference ever truly takes place, or is in fact possible. Brown is also
skeptical of this process, although she questions the position given to rights
discourse, and hence anti-discrimination law per se, in emancipatory politics.
She refers to the historical emergence of rights and points out that they arose
both as a means of protection against sovereign and social power and "as a
mode of securing and naturalizing dominant social powers-class, gender, and
so forth.' '208 This view that rights and discrimination discourse is also about the
maintenance of privilege is shared by Siegel as mentioned above. Both Brown
and Siegel suggest that rights "cut two or more ways" and thus believe that it is
necessary to query "incessantly" their place in emancipatory politics rather than
209blindly assume that their place is predetermined.
As an illustration of the need for caution, Brown refers to MacKinnon's
attempt to encode "women's collective experience" into the law. As discussed
above, MacKinnon's project is to employ rights discourse to seek equality for
women. She believes this will happen if the law is employed "to confront...
the inequalities in women's condition in order to change them. ,210 MacKinnon
asserts that equality law "provides a peculiar jurisprudential opportunity, a
crack in the wall between law and society., 211 And the "first step" in realizing
,212this opportunity "is to claim women's concrete reality." MacKinnon argues
that once equality law exposes that obscenity law, for example, is "based on the
point of view of male dominance," then the urgent issue for women is not the
avoidance of state intervention but the getting of access to speech. As many
critics have pointed out, one critical problem with this project is that
MacKinnon's view of "women's concrete reality" is not one shared by all
women. A number of feminists have argued that their experiences do not
correlate with MacKinnon's view of gender and sexuality as sexual violation.
They argue that she is attempting to encode law with a culturally and
historically specific view of women's experience. 213  If MacKinnon
understands the definition and ontology of "women" as being determined by
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pornography, is it emancipatory for women to have such a definition encoded
into the law?214 By asking the law to regulate subjects according to such
definitions, the law will effectively produce such subjects. In Brown's view,
MacKinnon's attempt to install a particular fiction of women in the law
produces a "potent mode of juridical-disciplinary domination" and a potential
intensification of the regulation of gender and sexuality.
215
Brown asserts that MacKinnon's "failed effort" stands as a general caution
against installing identity in the law because the law operates to naturalize such
"inevitably totalized formulations of identity" through regulating them.216 She
concludes by suggesting that "the specifications of identity in late twentieth
century rights discourse may be equally problematic for the social powers they
discursively renaturalize.... [R]ights must not be confused with equality nor
legal recognition with emancipation."
21 7
So what does this advice of caution mean for transgender litigation?
Brown is saying that newly politicized identities, such as transgender people,
must think through their assertion of identity strategically so as to be able to
imagine a future free of present injury. In other words, they must weigh the
value of present legal recognition of their "injury" with the danger that this
recognition may have the effect of fixing and totalizing the present condition of
this identity.
Newly politicized identities can learn from feminism that strategy is an
important consideration at every step. For example, it is important to query
"incessantly" the step of embracing either the U.S. sex stereotyping approach
or the Canadian approach in relation to transgender discrimination law. Like
MacKinnon's approach, both of these approaches use historical and cultural
fictions of identity as if they truly represented these identities. Ultimately, I
agree with Brown that caution is advisable either before entrusting the law with
the task of transforming stereotypes or before embracing the law's affirmation
and accommodation of astereotypical identities as an emancipatory approach.
In this paper I have endeavored to show that discrimination law can be
used by transgender claimants to seek protection and redress for the daily
harassment and discrimination they experience as a result of their non-
conforming appearance and behavior. However, I have also attempted to
demonstrate that discrimination law is not an avenue entirely free of danger.
This danger is posed by the operation of discrimination law and the categories
it employs to understand difference and identity. I have delineated the
approaches used in different jurisdictions and come to the conclusion that the
best approach is one that aims to accommodate and affirm such difference,
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rather than to eliminate it. This ideal appears to be that of the Canadian
approach, which systematically examines the social, economic, legal, and
historical context in which discrimination takes place and in which the legal
subject exists. This path has the potential to yield results for those seeking the
transformation of gender norms so long as law's impulses and limitations are
strategically considered.
In conclusion, I believe it is critical to emphasize that transgender people
and others should continue posing a disruption to the law's categories. It is
only through the painful process of confronting and disrupting law's categorical
approach that rigid gender norms embedded in the law can be shifted and
transformed.

